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RACE, POLICING, AND TECHNOLOGY* 
I. BENNETT CAPERS** 
This Essay argues that if we truly care about making policing 
egalitarian and fair to everyone, then that could mean more 
policing, not less. It advocates harnessing technology, including 
surveillance technology, to help deracialize policing. This turn to 
technology will not be cost free. Indeed, one cost will be the 
redistribution of privacy. This cost, especially to those who already 
enjoy a surfeit of privacy, might seem great. But even greater should 
be the possibility that technology can move society closer to 
egalitarian, race-free policing, and to the goal of true equality 
before the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I am a black man. I say this up front because, like Patricia Williams, 
I am convinced that subject position is everything in my analysis of the 
law.1 I say this up front, too, because when it comes to policing, my 
blackness means that I am a disturbing statistic. After all, as recently as 
2013, one in three black men could expect to go to prison during his 
lifetime.2 A prosecutor is more likely to seek higher charges against me,3 
and a jury is more likely to convict me than a white defendant based on 
similar evidence.4 According to the United States Sentencing 
Commission, if I am sent to prison, I will likely receive a sentence nearly 
twenty percent longer than a white offender for the same crime.5 I live in 
a world in which “[y]oung	+	[b]lack	+	[m]ale” too often “	=	[p]robable 
 
 1. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 3 (1991) (“Since 
subject position is everything in my analysis of the law, you deserve to know that it’s a bad 
morning.”). 
 2. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 1 (Aug. 2013), http://sentencingproject.org
/doc/publications/rd_ICCPR%20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7WG2-SXG7]. 
 3. See, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE, WHITNEY TYMAS & MARY CROWLEY, VERA INST. 
OF JUSTICE, RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 3 (2014), https://storage.googleapis
.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/race-and-prosecution-in-manhattan/legacy_downloads
/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXQ2-WUB2] (finding race to 
be a statistically significant factor in case outcomes); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: 
The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16–17 (1998) (discussing 
how prosecutorial discretion is a cause of racial injustice). 
 4. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial 
Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 189–90 
(2010) (finding that mock jurors possessed an implicit association between “black” and 
“guilty”); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of 
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 201, 217 (2001) (finding that white jurors demonstrated racial bias in non-race salient 
cases). 
 5. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED 
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 108 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites
/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/2012-booker
/Part_A.pdf#page=55 [https://perma.cc/9X89-B3LP]; Joe Palazzolo, Racial Gaps in Men’s 
Sentencing, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424127887324432004578304463789858002 [https://perma.cc/4QDB-7ZKY]. 
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[c]ause[,]”6 and where, as Professor Randall Kennedy has observed, 
there is a “racial tax[.]”7 I accordingly carry myself knowing that I will be 
watched by the police, scrutinized by the police, and that at any point I 
can be stopped by the police.8 As much as I might hope that my status as 
an academic might insulate me from racialized policing, my own 
experience and the experiences of numerous black professors suggest 
otherwise.9 After all, the police do not see an academic. They see only 
what they want to see, “figments of their imagination[,]”10 
“woven	.	.	.	out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories[,]”11 reducible to 
this: a black man. So, I am a black man. But not tragically so.12 In a 
sense, I am that black male because this is how I have been socially 
constructed.13 Change the construction and liberation should be possible. 
There is a final reason to foreground my blackness, here on this black 
and white page: I want to make an argument that might seem 
counterintuitive, that might rile libertarians and progressives, and that 
might even give pause to a few black folk. What I want to argue is that, if 
we truly care about making policing egalitarian and fair to everyone, 
then that might mean more policing, not less. More to the point, it will 
mean redistributing privacy. 
 
 6. See generally Elizabeth A. Gaynes, Essay, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where 
Young	+	Black	+	Male	=	Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621 (1993) (discussing how 
young black men are disproportionately targeted in the criminal justice system). 
 7. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1997). 
 8. See infra Section I.C. 
 9. As I have detailed elsewhere, a number of “law-abiding minority professors”—Cornel 
West, William Julius Wilson, Paul Butler, and Devon Carbado, to name just a few—have been 
subjected to police stops. I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, 
Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18 (2011). 
 10. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 3 (rev. ed. 2002). 
 11. FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 111 (Charles Lam Markmann trans., 
1967). 
 12. See ZORA NEALE HURSTON, How It Feels to Be Colored Me, in I LOVE MYSELF 
WHEN I AM LAUGHING	.	.	.	AND THEN AGAIN WHEN I AM LOOKING MEAN AND 
IMPRESSIVE 152, 152 (Alice Walker ed., 1979) (“But I am not tragically colored.”). 
 13. Race has little inherent meaning but is largely a social construct, a point recognized 
by both critical race scholars and geneticists. See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, 
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (2d ed. 1994) (describing racial formation as 
the “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, 
and destroyed”); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. 
L. REV. 741, 774 (1994) (“	‘[R]ace’ is neither a natural fact simply there in ‘reality,’ nor a 
wrong idea, eradicable by an act of will.”); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of 
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
6 (1994) (critiquing “existing theories of race” and advancing “a new theory of race as a social 
complex of meanings we continually replicate in our daily lives”). Ta-Nehisi Coates perhaps 
put it most elegantly: “[R]ace is the child of racism, not the father.” TA-NEHISI COATES, 
BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 7 (2015). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017) 
1244 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
Before elaborating, I should say that this Essay is only indirectly 
about police violence, the issue most associated with the Black Lives 
Matter movement and which is now part of the national zeitgeist,14 
though of course that issue is an important one. In 2015 alone, police 
killed over 224 unarmed men and women, almost half of them black like 
me.15 Video images, captured on cellphones and dashboard cameras, 
have become the nightly news in my brain, playing in an endless, “spirit-
murder[ing]”16 loop. Still, as someone who has thought and written 
about policing for a decade now, I know that police violence is not the 
disease, but rather a symptom of the far larger problem of racialized 
policing more generally.17 Every police shooting, after all, begins with a 
look, a suspicion, or an encounter. We can do little to address racialized 
police violence if we do nothing to address the far broader issue of 
racialized looks and encounters.18 
This Essay is accordingly about police looks and police encounters. 
It is also about technology and how harnessing technology can help 
deracialize policing. To be sure, the technology this Essay proposes 
comes at a cost. In exchange for a reduction of hard surveillance of 
people of color, it will require an increase in soft surveillance of 
 
 14. See, e.g., John Eligon, One Slogan, Many Methods: Black Lives Matter Enters Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/one-slogan-many-
methods-black-lives-matter-enters-politics.html [https://perma.cc/B9GN-TRPF] (discussing 
the formation of the Black Lives Matter movement and its evolving relationship with national 
politics). 
 15. See The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN, http://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database 
[https://perma.cc/9X7K-KL65 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 16. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as 
the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129–30 (1987) (examining racism as 
a crime and describing it as “spirit-murder”). 
 17. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 849–
53 (2008) [hereinafter Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying] (discussing the 
undemocratic policing and inegalitarianism of racial profiling); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, 
Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 45 (2009) [hereinafter Capers, Policing, 
Race, and Place] (examining how current policing methods contribute to residential 
segregation); Bennett Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists, 69 FLA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 29–32) [hereinafter Capers, Policing, Technology, and 
Doctrinal Assists], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2760388 [https://
perma.cc/N5K6-CNBA (staff-uploaded archive)] (discussing how black and Hispanic 
individuals are stopped and frisked more commonly than white individuals); Capers, supra 
note 9, at 18 (discussing racial profiling by police officers). 
 18. Devon Carbado makes a similar point. As he notes, “	‘front-end’ police contact 
(which Fourth Amendment law enables) is often the predicate to ‘back-end’ police violence 
(which Fourth Amendment law should help to prevent).” Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping 
Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Violence, 105 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 103), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2844312 [https://perma.cc/856T-3NRL (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
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everyone.19 In short, it will require a redistribution of privacy. This might 
seem too much of a sacrifice for some. It is certainly unlikely to sit well 
with those who are unwilling to adopt, even temporarily, a Rawlsian 
“veil of ignorance”20 and imagine what type of policing would be fair if 
they themselves were black or brown.21 Absent some “interest 
convergence,”22 white Americans who currently enjoy a surfeit of 
privacy might balk at ceding some privacy to those who are black like 
me.23 But hear me out. I do think I can make a persuasive and utilitarian 
argument, even to the naysayers. 
I begin, in Part I, by limning some of the problems with policing, 
with a particular focus on racial profiling. But lest anyone think I am 
unfairly singling out the police, I make clear that some courts have been 
anything but innocent bystanders when it comes to racialized policing. 
The Supreme Court, time and time again, has in effect aided and abetted 
 
 19. See Gary T. Marx, Soft Surveillance: The Growth of Mandatory Volunteerism in 
Collecting Personal Information—“Hey Buddy Can You Spare a DNA?”, in SURVEILLANCE 
AND SECURITY 37, 37–38 (Torin Monahan ed., 2006). The term “soft surveillance” comes 
from sociologist Gary T. Marx, who uses it to refer to surveillance that relies on persuasion to 
achieve compliance, increased inclusiveness of the targeted class, and an emphasis on the 
needs of society as a whole over individual needs. See id. Hard surveillance, by contrast, is 
marked by more direct police interaction, such as individual surveillance, stops, and frisks. Id. 
 20. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 136–42 (1971). In his highly influential 
book, Rawls propounds a thought experiment in which citizens are behind a “veil of 
ignorance” that blinds them to what attributes they might have, such as their race, sex, or 
wealth. See id. at 137. Rawls writes: 
It is assumed, then, that	.	.	.	no one knows his place in society, his class position or 
social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and 
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his 
conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special 
features of his psychology	.	.	.	.	More than this, I assume that the parties do not 
know	.	.	.	[their society’s] economic or political situation, or the level of civilization 
and culture it has been able to achieve. 
Id. From this “original position” of innocence, citizens would be better positioned to imagine 
a system of justice that is free from self-interest. See id. at 19. 
 21. For more on how such “switching” exercises—what I have elsewhere termed “cross 
dressing”—might lead to a more egalitarian criminal justice system, see I. Bennett Capers, 
Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 4 (2008) (arguing that “the 
imaginative act of cross dressing others” can “disrupt inappropriate biases in the criminal 
arena”). 
 22. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (noting that the interest of minorities in 
achieving equality is accommodated only when it converges with the interest of the majority). 
 23. I am not the first to write about the unequal distribution of privacy along lines that 
implicate race. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 407–12 (2003) (arguing that privacy is unequally 
distributed, benefiting those with property and money in ways that correlate with race); 
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1265, 1265–67 (1999) (similar). 
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racialized policing. Far from furthering a goal of equality before the law, 
the Supreme Court has contributed to that goal’s very opposite, in effect 
invoking a type of policing exceptionalism.24 This background informs 
my argument that it is time to look elsewhere to address policing 
problems. That elsewhere, as Part II makes clear, is technology. In short, 
there are ways to harness technology to reduce racialized policing. Such 
“techno-policing,” Part III acknowledges, will come as a cost. It will 
involve widespread soft surveillance, for a start. And it will mean the 
redistribution of privacy: many will have to cede some of the privacy 
that they currently enjoy. Part III accordingly makes the argument that 
this redistribution is a net good that ultimately will redound to 
everyone’s benefit. More than that, the cost could be necessary if we 
care about “mak[ing] America what America must become”25—“fair, 
egalitarian, responsive to the needs of all of its citizens, and truly 
democratic in all respects, including its policing[.]”26 
I.  RACE AND THE WAY WE POLICE NOW 
For many Americans, the recent spate of police acts of violence 
against those of us who are black and brown has been, quite simply, an 
education. Captured on cellphones and dashboard cameras, these acts of 
violence have become part of the national news, sparking a national 
conversation about policing and race. 
But for other Americans, for those of us of a darker hue, for those 
of us on “the bottom[,]”27 for those of us marked as policed, the spate of 
police violence is not news. Nor is it new. Such acts of violence are part 
of our “pools of knowledge[,]”28 talked about in barbershops and hair 
salons, on church pews and on street corners, and yes, in prisons. Such 
racialized police violence is “a constant reminder of the space between 
 
 24. See infra Section I.D. 
 25. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 9 (Modern Library ed. 1995) (1962) 
(“[G]reat men have done great things here, and will again, and we can make America what 
America must become.”). 
 26. Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, supra note 17, at 880. 
 27. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (“Looking to the bottom—adopting the 
perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise [of a neutral 
application of the law]—can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the 
phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice.”). 
 28. See David R. Maines, Information Pools and Racialized Narrative Structures, 40 SOC. 
Q. 317, 319–20 (1999) (noting that information is often race based, with blacks being privy to 
certain information that is largely unknown by whites, and vice versa); see also Russell K. 
Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1120 (2008) (“In general, black 
and white people obtain information through different informational networks, which results 
in racialized pools of knowledge.”). 
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freedom and ‘unfreedom,’ where the contested citizenship of African 
Americans is held.”29 It is why so many black and brown parents teach 
their kids that, when it comes to policing, the notion that we are all 
equal before the law might be someone’s reality. But it is not theirs. 
For those of us who are black and brown, it is hard to imagine a 
time when there was not a problem with police violence, whether it was 
the casual cruelty of overseers,30 the violence inflicted by slave patrols,31 
or the extralegal justice in the form of lynchings that lasted well into the 
1950s.32 But it is the problem of policing in the last half-century that I 
focus on here. Below, I briefly discuss three of those problems—police 
violence, underenforcement, and racial profiling—with particular 
attention to racial profiling. I then turn to the subordinating role the 
Supreme Court has played with respect to these issues. Far from 
furthering its claimed goal of a color-blind Constitution,33 the Court has 
effectively given its blessing to the opposite.34 
A. Police Violence 
On October 13, 2015, at a Democratic primary presidential debate, 
each of the candidates responded to a recorded question on whether 
“[b]lack lives	.	.	.	matter.”35 Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders responded, 
“The reason those words matter is the African-American community 
knows that on any given day some innocent person like Sandra Bland 
can get into a car and then three days later she’s going to end up dead in 
 
 29. KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK 
LIBERATION 108 (2016).  
 30. EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 
14–18 (First Vintage Books ed. 1976) (1972). 
 31. Scholars have noted that “the targeting of African Americans in particular is 
reminiscent of the slave patrols that demanded ‘passes’ from blacks found in public spaces.” 
SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS 117 (2001); see also ANDREW E. TASLITZ, 
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 106 (2006) (discussing slave patrols); Joe R. 
Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places, 56 
AM. SOC. REV. 101, 102 (1991) (discussing public sites of discrimination). 
 32. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY 
OF RACIAL TERROR 5 (2d ed. 2015) (determining that 4,075 racial terror lynchings occurred 
in twelve southern states between 1877 and 1950); see also NAACP, THIRTY YEARS OF 
LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1889–1918, at 7–8 (1919) (determining that 3,224 people 
were killed by lynching mobs between 1889 and 1918). 
 33. For an examination and a critique of cases claiming this ideal, see generally Neil 
Gotunda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) 
(arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s use of color-blind constitutionalism fosters 
white racial domination). 
 34. See infra Section I.D. 
 35. Reena Flores, Democratic Debate: Do Black Lives Matter?, CBSNEWS.COM (Oct. 13, 
2015, 11:50 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/democratic-debate-do-black-lives-matter/ 
[https://perma.cc/K9UA-3NF4]. 
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jail or their kids are going to get shot[.]”36 He added, “We need to 
combat institutional racism from top to bottom and we need major, 
major reforms in a broken criminal justice system.”37 Former Maryland 
Governor Martin O’Malley also weighed in, agreeing that “[b]lack lives 
matter” and adding, “[W]e have a lot of work to do to reform our 
criminal justice system and to address race relations in our country.”38 
For her part, Hillary Clinton, who had previously met with Black Lives 
Matter activists, advocated for the more widespread adoption of police-
worn body cameras.39 
There is a reason why “black lives matter” has become part of the 
national conversation, and it has much to do with acts of police violence 
captured on video. These acts include the fatal death of Eric Garner, 
who died after being placed in a prohibited chokehold by Officer Daniel 
Pantaleo in Staten Island, New York, on July 17, 2014.40 Garner’s crime 
was selling loose cigarettes on the street.41 They include the police 
shooting death of Walter Scott, who was shot in the back by police 
officer Michael Slager in North Charleston, South Carolina on April 4, 
2015.42 Scott’s crime was having a “broken brake light.”43 They include 
the police shooting of Laquan McDonald, the seventeen-year-old 
teenager who was recorded getting shot in the back sixteen times in 
fifteen seconds by police officer Jason Van Dyke on October 20, 2014.44 
McDonald’s crime was walking down the block with a knife with his 
back to the police.45 They include the video of Dajerria Becton, the 
fifteen-year old teenage girl who was body slammed to the ground by a 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Eric Bradner & Dan Merica, Clinton on Facebook: “Black Lives Matter” and Other 
Takeaways, CNN (July 21, 2015, 2:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/20/politics/hillary-
clinton-facebook-black-lives-matter/index.html [https://perma.cc/EK38-4SZZ]. 
 40. Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path 
to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14
/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5V3X-XUPB]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Dana Ford, South Carolina Ex-Police Officer Indicted in Walter Scott Killing, CNN 
(June 8, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/08/us/south-carolina-slager-indictment-
walter-scott/ [https://perma.cc/E3EE-QLY2]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Wayne Drash, The Killing of Laquan McDonald: The Dashcam Video vs. Police 
Accounts, CNN (Dec. 19, 2015, 12:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/us/laquan-
mcdonald-video-records-comparison/ [https://perma.cc/2MKE-NASX]. Video of this shooting 
is available online. Warning, Graphic Content: Laquan McDonald Shooting Dash-Cam Video, 
CHI. TRIBUNE, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-laquan-mcdonald-
police-dashboard-short-video-premiumvideo.html [https://perma.cc/ECU8-EYG5]. 
 45. Id. 
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Texas police officer at a graduation pool party.46 Becton’s crime was 
crashing the pool party with other teenagers.47 And they include the 
cellphone-captured video of Shakara,48 the sixteen-year-old foster 
student who was flipped out of her desk and dragged across a room by 
Senior Deputy Ben Fields, a school resource officer.49 Her crime was not 
putting away her cell phone in class quickly enough.50 
For those of us who are black or brown, these acts of violence are 
anything but new. After all, even before the advent of ubiquitous 
smartphones, dashboard cameras, and body worn cameras, video 
recordings existed, though they were rare. For example, in 1991, 
videotaped images of several Los Angeles police officers beating 
Rodney King with billy clubs, kicking him, and stunning him with a 
Taser “stun gun” were captured on a neighbor’s camcorder.51 There was 
also the 2005 police beating of sixty-four-year-old Robert Davis in 
Louisiana, which happened to be caught on camera by an Associated 
Press television news crew.52 But even when police violence was not 
caught on tape, even when there was no “white witness” (to borrow 
Lolita Buckner Innis’s term for the role cameras now play),53 those of us 
 
 46. Carol Cole-Frowe & Richard Fausset, Jarring Image of Police’s Use of Force at Texas 
Pool Party, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/us/mckinney-tex-
pool-party-dispute-leads-to-police-officer-suspension.html [https://perma.cc/6TW8-5H2J]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Jenny Jarvie, Girl Thrown from Desk Didn’t Obey Because the Punishment Was 
Unfair, Attorney Says, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015, 11:53 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation
/la-na-girl-thrown-punishment-unfair-20151029-story.html [https://perma.cc/F6EV-NYFZ 
(staff-uploaded archive)] (noting that her attorney identified the minor by her first name, 
Shakara). 
 49. Alan Blinder, Ben Fields, South Carolina Deputy, Fired over Student Arrest, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/south-carolina-deputy-ben-
fields-fired.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TV8D-DFJR]; Polly Mosendz, Report: South Carolina 
Student Flipped by Police Officer Is in Foster Care, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 28, 2015, 4:29 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/south-carolina-student-flipped-police-officer-foster-care-388119 
[https://perma.cc/NXQ7-NMLY]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at A1; Hector Tobar & Richard Lee Colvin, Witnesses Depict 
Relentless Beating, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at B1. As a result of this beating, King suffered 
eleven broken bones at the base of his skull, a fractured cheekbone, and a broken leg. The 
Rodney King Affair, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-24/local
/me-1422_1_king-s-injuries-officer-laurence-m-powell-beating [https://perma.cc/MFL7-AJNG]. 
 52. See Christine Hauser & Christopher Drew, 3 Police Officers Deny Battery Charges 
After Videotaped Beating in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A16. 
 53. As Lolita Buckner Inniss observes, 
[v]ideo surveillance sometimes provides much needed valorization for	.	.	.	less 
regarded private people [those possessing little power or authority]. This is because 
private people are far more often lied about, lied to and deemed liars. Hence private 
people often lose in battles of opposing narratives with public people about what has 
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who are black and brown knew. Even absent a tape, we knew about and 
felt viscerally the fatal shooting of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed 
immigrant from Guinea, who was shot forty-one times while attempting 
to identify himself by displaying his wallet.54 Even without a video, we 
fretted over the shooting of Sean Bell by police officers the day before 
his wedding.55 In 1999, no one recorded Officer Justin Volpe sodomizing 
Abner Louima with a broomstick in a station house bathroom, requiring 
three operations and two months of hospitalization, because the officer 
mistakenly believed Louima had punched him earlier, but still we 
shuddered.56 Nor were there cameras to capture the police shooting of 
sixty-six-year old Eleanor Bumpurs, an arthritic woman who resisted 
being evicted from her apartment.57 When Bumpurs refused to open the 
door, the police broke the door and tried to subdue her, eventually 
shooting her twice with a 12-gauge shotgun.58 Even now, we know, even 
if other Americans do not, that most police violence continues to go 
unrecorded59 and that the common denominator is the color blue, not 
black or white.60 We know police violence is far more widespread than 
 
occurred. In such cases, video surveillance becomes a mostly neutral, unlikely to lie, 
legitimizing witness. For many of these private people, especially women, people of 
color or other relatively powerless people, especially women, people of color or other 
relatively powerless people in society, video surveillance is the modern day white 
witness. 
Lolita Buckner Innis, Video Surveillance as White Witnesses, AIN’T I A FEMINIST LEGAL 
SCHOLAR TOO? (Sept. 30, 2012), http://innissfls.blogspot.com/2012/09/video-surveillance-as-
white-witnesses.html [https://perma.cc/7NJN-ZFXA]. 
 54. See Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1; Amy Waldman, A Hard Worker with a Gentle Smile, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at B5; Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo 
Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com
/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diallo-shooting-are-acquitted-all-
charges.html [https://perma.cc/DK5P-YYUA]. 
 55. See William K. Rashbaum & Al Baker, 50 Bullets, One Dead, and Many Questions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at B1. 
 56. See David Barstow, Officer, Seeking Mercy, Admits to Louima’s Torture, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 26, 1999, at A1; Joseph P. Fried, Volpe Sentenced to a 30-Year Term in Louima Torture, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at A1; Leonard Levitt, The Louima Verdicts: Some Splits, But Blue 
Wall Stands, NEWSDAY, June 9, 1999, at A4. Officer Justin Volpe eventually pleaded guilty to 
sodomizing Louima; a second officer was convicted aiding in the assault. See Fried, supra, at 
A1. 
 57. Selwyn Raab, Officer Indicted in Bumpers Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 1985), http://
www.nytimes.com/1985/02/01/nyregion/officer-indicted-in-bumpurs-case.html [https://perma
.cc/P4PX-RYMJ]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Black, White, and Blue: Americans’ Attitudes on Race and Police, ROPER 
CTR. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/black-white-blue-americans-attitudes-
race-police/ [https://perma.cc/XDZ5-LR8A]. 
 60. Minority officers are not exempt from engaging in racial profiling or using excessive 
force, as demonstrated by the shooting of Sean Bell by minority officers, the more recent 
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the videos that, through the happenstance of a camera or witnesses, 
make the evening news.61 This police violence surrounds us, at least 
those of us who are black or brown. To us, we look forward to the day 
when police violence is, in fact, “news.”62 Now, it is only new to those 
too young to know that there is not yet equality under the law. So we tell 
our sons and daughters, but especially our sons: “It’s unlikely but 
possible that you could get killed today. Or any day. I’m sorry, but that’s 
the truth. Black maleness is a potentially fatal condition.”63 We tell 
them, as Ta-Nehisi Coates tells his son in his brutally honest Between the 
World and Me, 
the police departments of your country have been endowed with 
the authority to destroy your body. It does not matter if the 
destruction is the result of an unfortunate overreaction. It does 
not matter if it originates in a misunderstanding. It does not 
 
shooting of Keith Lamont Scott in Charlotte, North Carolina, and prosecution of officers in 
the Freddie Gray case. See, e.g., Sean Bell Shooting: Lessons from a Tragedy, NEWSWEEK 
(Apr. 24, 2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sean-bell-shooting-lessons-tragedy-86351 
[https://perma.cc/JF4U-2KMR]; see also Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, Charlotte Officer 
‘Justified’ in Fatal Shooting of Keith Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/us/charlotte-officer-acted-lawfully-in-fatal-shooting-of-keith-scott.html 
[https://perma.cc/59ST-HVSP] (noting that the officer who fired the fatal shot is black); Derek 
Hawkins, Lynh Bui & Peter Hermann, Baltimore Prosecutors Drop All Remaining Charges in 
Freddie Gray Case, WASH. POST (July 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/public-safety/baltimore-prosecutors-drop-all-remaining-charges-in-freddie-gray-case/2016
/07/27/b5c10f34-b655-4d40-87e6-80827e2f0e2d_story.html?utm_term=.8f3f6662a23e [https://
perma.cc/9GCP-8WMR] (observing that three of the six charged officers are black). Nor 
should this be surprising. Social cognition research suggests that almost everyone, regardless 
of race, has implicit biases. See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of 
Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 752–54 (2001). 
Performance theory provides a second explanation. In short, to make themselves acceptable 
to fellow officers, minority officers may “perform” as they believe majority officers would. See 
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 
YALE L.J. 1757, 1792–93 (2003) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Critical Race Theory] 
(reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco 
Valdes et al. eds., 2002)). For more on performance theory and how it rewards minorities who 
engage in assimilationist and “comfort strategies” to fit in, including strategies that are 
harmful to their minority group, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1300–01 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity]. 
Also, employers are more likely to hire minority officers who are “racially palatable” and 
accept majority norms. Carbado & Gulati, Critical Race Theory, supra, at 1793. For more on 
this phenomenon, see id. at 1792–93. 
 61. For an aggregation of statistics on police violence, see MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, 
http://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ [https://perma.cc/S4QJ-GMNQ] (last updated Jan. 1, 2017). 
 62. See News, MERIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/news [https://perma.cc/56DN-RZM8] (designating “news” as meaning “previously 
unknown information”). 
 63. Touré, How to Talk to Young Black Boys about Trayvon Martin, TIME (Mar. 21, 
2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/03/21/how-to-talk-to-young-black-boys-about-trayvon-
martin/ [https://perma.cc/2L92-VUTN]. 
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matter if the destruction springs from a foolish policy. Sell 
cigarettes without the proper authority and your body can be 
destroyed. Resent the people trying to entrap your body and it 
can be destroyed. Turn into a dark stairwell and your body can be 
destroyed. The destroyers will rarely be held accountable. Mostly 
they will receive pensions. And destruction is merely the 
superlative form of a dominion whose prerogatives include 
friskings, detaining, beatings, and humiliations. All of this is 
common to black people. And all of this is old for black people. 
No one is held responsible.64 
B. Underenforcement 
For those of us of a darker hue, there is another issue we know 
intimately: the issue of underenforcement, or the failure of the state to 
provide communities with equal protection of the criminal laws.65 It is an 
issue that Jill Leovy, a white journalist, recently explored in her widely 
praised exposé, Ghettoside.66 But again, for black and brown folk, the 
problem is an old one. Even before Professor Randall Kennedy 
observed that “the principle injury suffered by African-Americans in 
relation to criminal matters is not overenforcement but 
underenforcement of the laws[,]”67 the group Public Enemy was rapping 
“911 is a Joke[,]”68 Tracy Chapman was singing in “Behind the Wall” 
that “the police always come late/If they come at all[,]”69 and James 
Baldwin was noting that the police “certainly do not protect the lives or 
property of Negroes[.]”70 In short, black and brown folk have known 
that underenforcement pervades every level of criminal justice. 
 
 64. COATES, supra note 13, at 9. 
 65. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716–22 (2006); 
see also DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 139–41 (2008) 
(“[I]nadequate policing can be as much a threat to democracy as overly harsh policing.”). This 
underenforcement can take numerous forms, including the failure to diligently investigate and 
prosecute cases involving minority victims, and the failure to seek adequate punishment in 
cases involving minority victims. This underenforcement contributes to what Monica Bell 
describes as “legal cynicism,” the feeling shared by many African Americans that they are 
“essentially stateless, unprotected by the law and its enforcers, marginal to the project of 
making American society.” Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal 
Cynicism, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1–2) (on file with author). 
 66. JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE 8–12, 316–19 (2015) (using a homicide in South Los 
Angeles to explore the larger issue of homicide rates in poor, black communities, larger 
society’s historical indifference to such homicides, and arguing for greater state intervention 
in providing the type of policing that provides justice to these black victims).  
 67. KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 19. 
 68. PUBLIC ENEMY, 911 Is a Joke, on FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (Def Jam Records 
1990). 
 69. TRACY CHAPMAN, Behind the Wall, on TRACY CHAPMAN (Elektra Records 1988). 
 70. James Baldwin, Fear of the Police, PAGEANT, Dec. 1964, at 188–89. 
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And studies validate our “pools of knowledge.”71 Consider capital 
punishment, often considered an example of overenforcement by white 
progressives.72 Black and brown communities also understand capital 
punishment as yet another example of underenforcement.73 In a sense, 
the Baldus study of death penalty prosecutions in Georgia confirmed 
what those of us who are black and brown already knew: prosecutors 
were less likely to seek the death penalty in cases involving minority 
victims, and even when they did seek it, jurors were less likely to 
recommend death.74 We might have not realized the magnitude of the 
disparity—that, even after taking into account non-racial variables, 
“defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to 
receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.”75 
But that black and brown lives were not valued like white lives, even in 
courts of law—that we knew. 
Studies have revealed similar patterns of underenforcement in rape 
cases. For example, there is Gary LaFree’s oft-cited study, Rape and 
Criminal Justice.76 Examining the impact of race in processing decisions 
in 881 forcible sex offenses reported to the Indianapolis police during a 
three-year period, LaFree found that although black men accused of 
assaulting black women accounted for forty-five percent of the reported 
rapes, they accounted for only seventeen percent of all men who 
received sentences of six years or more.77 By contrast, black men 
accused of assaulting white women accounted for “[fifty] percent of all 
men who received sentences of six or more years.”78 That black victims 
were comparatively undervalued remained true even when LaFree 
 
 71. Robinson, supra note 28, at 1120. 
 72. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for 
Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 323 (2010) 
(considering the possibility of the death penalty being overenforced in wealthy localities). 
 73. Cf. Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the 
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1391–93 (1988) (observing that race of victim 
disparities in capital punishment prosecutions indicate a devaluation of black victims and that 
black communities are “disadvantaged by the relative leniency extended to killers of blacks”).  
 74. DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL 
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 4 (1990) (“[O]ur research convinces us that in the 
absence of some	.	.	.	system of oversight, a substantial level of arbitrary and discriminatory 
death sentencing under the laws as currently drawn is inevitable.”); see also Barbara O’Brien 
et al., Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and Sentencing in North Carolina, 
1990–2009, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (2016) (“The analysis here strongly suggests that in 
death-eligible murder cases with at least one white victim, defendants are more likely to be 
sentenced to death than all other cases.”). The Baldus study is cited and formed the basis for 
the challenge to the death penalty in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).  
 75. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. 
 76. GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1989). 
 77. Id. at 129, 133. 
 78. Id. 
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controlled for other factors, including whether the defendant and victim 
were strangers.79 
Again, this underenforcement permeates every aspect of the 
criminal justice system when it comes to victims who are black or brown, 
whether they are victims of burglary or vandalism, assault or fraud.80 As 
Alexandra Natapoff has observed, all of this has the expressive effect of 
“send[ing] an official message of dismissal and devaluation.”81 
C. Racial Profiling 
Though the two problems I have discussed so far—police violence 
and underenforcement—are important, I want to focus on a third 
problem, although I will return to the first two later. I focus on this third 
problem, racial profiling, for several reasons. One, it seems clear that 
isolated incidents of police violence, while problems in themselves, are 
also symptomatic of a much larger problem of racialized policing in 
general. To put this differently, acts of police violence tend to begin with 
racialized encounters, stops, frisks, and arrests.82 Two, to the extent the 
problem of underenforcement is one of resources and priorities, it might 
be that the best way to counter that problem is by first addressing 
aggressive racial profiling tactics so that resources can be redirected to 
tackle actual crime. Three, I focus on racial profiling because the 
evidence here is abundant and points in one direction. The data 
discussed below confirm what black and brown communities long ago 
dubbed “Walking While Black” and “Driving While Black[.]”83 When it 
comes to racial profiling, the numbers are the argument. 
 
 79. See id. at 135–43. 
 80. Natapoff, supra note 65, at 1722–31. Even 911 response times might depend on the 
race of the neighborhood, as a recent internal report of the Milwaukee Police Department 
demonstrated. See Colleen Henry, MPD Report Says South Side 911 Calls Answered Twice as 
Fast as North Side, WISN (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.wisn.com/article/mpd-report-says-
south-side-911-calls-answered-twice-as-fast-as-north-side/6329541 [https://perma.cc/33HH-
AMSU]. 
 81. Natapoff, supra note 65, at 1749. 
 82. This connection between front-end policing and back-end police violence has not 
been lost on scholars. See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 18 (manuscript at 103); Alice Ristroph, 
The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 10), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2847300 [https://perma.cc/Y24G-6DS3 
(staff-uploaded archive)] (discussing the short, “thin blue line from an initial police-civilian 
encounter to an officer’s authorization to use deadly force”). 
 83. For one of the early and seminal discussions of these phenomena, see David A. 
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 265, 265 (1999). For Latinos, there is also the phenomenon known as “Driving While 
Brown[.]” Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposal for Ending Racial 
Profiling in Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2005) 
(discussing the profiling of Latinos). 
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Consider the numbers from Floyd v. City of New York,84 a recent 
class-action suit challenging the New York City police department’s 
aggressive stop-and-frisk practices as violating the Fourth Amendment 
and the equal protection clause.85 Between January 2004 and June 2012, 
the New York City Police Department made over 4.4 million forcible 
stops of individuals, 83% of whom were black or Hispanic.86 To put this 
in perspective, stops of whites, if spread across the population of New 
York City, would amount to stops of approximately 2.6% of the white 
population.87 By contrast, stops of blacks spread across the population of 
New York City would amount to stops of approximately 21.1% of the 
population.88 
Nor is New York alone. Studies have found evidence of racial 
profiling in Los Angeles: a study by Professor Ian Ayres found that the 
stop rate was 3,400 stops higher per 10,000 residents for blacks than for 
whites, and almost 360 stops higher for Hispanics than for whites, even 
after controlling for variables such as the rate of violent and property 
crimes.89 In Philadelphia, a recent review of pedestrian stops found that 
80.23% of the stops were of minorities, far greater than their 
representation in the population.90 In Minnesota, a study found that 
black drivers were stopped 214% more than expected and Latino drivers 
95% more than expected.91 In Maryland, a report by the Maryland State 
Police found that African-Americans comprised 72.9% of all of the 
 
 84. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 85. Id. at 556. 
 86. Id. at 556, 558. This number is likely conservative, since officers sometimes neglect to 
document each stop. See id. at 559; see also First Report of the Monitor, Floyd v. City of New 
York at 5, No. 1:08-cv-01034 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2015), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files
/attach/2015/07/Floyd%20Monitors%20Report%207%209%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9GLQ-SSLB] (“NYPD has conducted several precinct audits and concluded that some stops 
were made but not documented.”). 
 87. See Press Release, Analysis of New NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Data Reveals Dramatic 
Impact on Black New Yorkers, ACLU N.Y. (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice
/racialprofiling/33095prs20071126.html [https://perma.cc/DE9B-XN34]; cf. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 
2d at 558–59 (describing the number of blacks stopped in New York City between 2004 and 
2012). 
 88. See id. 
 89. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE 
OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 27 (Oct. 2008), https://www
.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/11837125-LAPD-Racial-
Profiling-Report-ACLU.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9GK-7BTU]. 
 90. See Plaintiff’s Fifth Report to Court and Monitor of Stop and Frisk Practices, Bailey 
v. City of Philadelphia at 13, C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015), https://www
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PA-0013-0005.pdf [https://perma.cc/W52Y-8NCV]. 
 91. David Montgomery, Data Dive: Racial Disparities in Minnesota Traffic Stops, 
TWINCITIES.COM (July 8, 2016, 5:46 PM), http://www.twincities.com/2016/07/08/data-dive-
racial-disparities-in-minnesota-traffic-stops/ [https://perma.cc/FER2-797D]. 
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drivers stopped and searched along a stretch of I-95, even though they 
comprised only 17.5% of the drivers violating traffic laws on the road.92 
In Boston, an analysis of more than 200,000 Boston Police Department 
records of police-citizen encounters (which include observations, 
interrogations, stops, frisks, and searches) revealed that blacks were 
subjected to 63% of these encounters even though they make up just 
24% of Boston’s population.93 In Texas, an analysis of fifteen million 
traffic stops showed that Hispanic drivers were 33% more likely to be 
subjected to searches than whites.94 In New Jersey, statistician John 
Lamberth’s study revealed that black drivers along I-95 were 4.85 times 
as likely to be stopped as similarly situated whites.95 In Greensboro, 
North Carolina, an analysis of tens of thousands of traffic stops and 
arrest data also found “wide racial difference in measure after measure 
of police conduct.”96 Even a liberal enclave like San Francisco is not 
immune. There, a U.S. Department of Justice study recently found that 
black drivers were 24% more likely to be stopped than their 
proportional representation in the population would suggest.97 Similar 
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 95. See John Lamberth, Driving While Black: A Statistician Proves That Prejudice Still 
Rules the Road, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 32, 32–33 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael 
D. White eds., 2010). 
 96. See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving 
While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-
disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/FTH9-JEMJ]. For more evidence 
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/X5ZP/VTQZ]; Matt Zapotosky, Justice Department Report Blasts San Francisco Police, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-
department-report-blasts-san-francisco-police/2016/10/12/becb841c-90a2-11e6-a6a3-d50061aa9fae
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racial disparities have been found in a host of other jurisdictions, both 
large and small.98 
D. Juridical Subordination 
Standing alone, any one of these problems—police violence, 
underenforcement, and racial profiling—would be disconcerting and at 
odds with our goal of equality before the law. But it is the role that the 
Supreme Court has played in this state of affairs that warrants further 
scrutiny. The Court has not been an innocent bystander to unequal 
policing. Rather, the Court has been a facilitator, engaging in what Roy 
Brooks refers to as “juridical subordination[.]”99 
The Supreme Court’s facilitation of unequal policing is certainly 
true with respect to police violence. Confronted with evidence of 
systemic police violence, the Court has repeatedly erected roadblocks. 
For example, when confronted with a class action suit seeking injunctive 
relief against police brutality, the Court in Rizzo v. Goode100 held that, 
despite the past pervasiveness of police brutality, similar future behavior 
was too speculative to warrant injunctive relief.101 The Court then 
reaffirmed this holding in Los Angeles v. Lyons.102 And in Graham v. 
Conner,103 the Court ruled that the amount of force officers are entitled 
to use must be construed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer 
on the scene,”104 a standard that is by definition self-serving and easily 
 
_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_sanfran-1030pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory [https://
perma.cc/2FA3-Q8YK]. 
 98. See Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, supra note 17, at 850–51 & n.86 (citing 
to jurisdictions); see also Harris, supra note 83, at 277–88 (describing reports from several 
states).  
 99. See ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING FROM LEGAL 
FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 188 (1st ed. 2002) (defining the term to mean “structural 
limitations that disadvantage outsiders”). 
 100. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
 101. Id. at 375–76. 
 102. 461 U.S. 95, 103–05 (1983) (holding lower court lacked jurisdiction to entertain 
Lyon’s claim for injunctive relief barring the use of chokeholds by Los Angeles officers; prior 
use of chokeholds, including against Lyons, could not establish a real and immediate threat 
that police would again use a chokehold against Lyons personally). In 1994, Congress restored 
some potential for injunctive relief by enacting 42 U.S.C. §	14141 as part of the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which empowers the U.S. Attorney General to 
seek injunctive relief against police departments based on a pattern or practice of misconduct 
depriving persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. See 42 
U.S.C. §	14141 (2012). For more on the application of this provision, see Barbara E. 
Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 525–
33 (2004). 
 103. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 104. Id. at 396. 
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manipulated to benefit police officers.105 Perhaps most troubling, in 
Screws v. United States,106 the Court read 18 U.S.C. §	242 (formerly 18 
U.S.C. §	52), which prohibits depriving a person’s rights under the color 
of law, as requiring proof that a police officer had “a specific intent to 
deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other 
rule of law[.]”107 
The Court has played a similar role with respect to 
underenforcement. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services,108 the Court effectively shut down the main avenue for 
citizens to protest underenforcement through the court system when it 
made clear that there is no due process “right” to state protection from 
 
 105. For example, police are often trained to assume that lethal force may be used when a 
dangerous person is within twenty-one feet of an officer. See John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and 
Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 21 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 
155, 175–76 (2016). This twenty-one feet rule, familiar to officers, thus may be invoked to 
justify a shooting as “reasonable” even where the facts standing alone do not lend themselves 
to reasonableness. See id. For a discussion of how this rule allows police to be hyper-defensive 
and serves to “justify” shootings, see Nancy C. Marcus, Out of Breath and down to the Wire: A 
Call for Constitution-Focused Police Reform, 59 HOWARD L.J. 5, 11 (2015). See also Gross, 
supra, at 169–76. 
 106. 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
 107. Id. at 103. In Screws, a Georgia sheriff, along with two deputies, bludgeoned to death 
a handcuffed black man. Id. at 92–93. When local authorities failed to investigate the killing, 
federal authorities stepped in and charged the sheriff with violating 18 U.S.C. §	242 (formerly 
18 U.S.C. §	52), which prohibits violence under color of law. Id. at 93. However, the Supreme 
Court vacated the conviction, finding that the statute was impermissibly vague and that to 
save the statute from unconstitutionality, a “specific intent to deprive a person of a federal 
right made definite by decision or other rule of law” must be read into the statute. Id. at 103. 
As commentators have noted, on remand, the jury was presented with the same evidence but 
this time was instructed that it must find that the sheriff, in bludgeoning the handcuffed 
prisoner to death, had the specific intent to deprive the prisoner of a constitutional right. See 
ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 114–15 (1947); Frederick M. 
Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 
TUL. L. REV. 2113, 2186 & n.329 (1999). Faced with this hurdle, the jury was reported to have 
acquitted. Id. Since Screws, prosecutions of officers under §	242 have been rare, in part 
because of the difficulty in proving that an officer acted with the requisite mens rea, as Paul 
Chevigny has observed of §	242 prosecutions: 
To get a conviction, the [federal] prosecution must prove “specific intent” on the part 
of the local official to violate a federal right, as distinct, for example, from an intent 
simply to assault the victim.	.	.	.	The usual difficulties in prosecuting police in any 
system, combined with the high standard of intent and the deference to local 
prosecutors, mean that federal criminal law contributes little to the accountability of 
local police for acts of violence. 
PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 107–08 
(1995). For more on the impact of Screws, see Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: 
The Circumvention of Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 722 (1996); 
David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives 
in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 19–20 (1999). 
 108. 489 U.S. 189 (1999). 
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private violence,109 a ruling that certainly disadvantages the poor and 
minorities who are least likely to be able to afford private protection. 
The Court reaffirmed that decision in Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales,110 a suit brought by a brown woman111 after the police ignored 
her calls that her husband had violated a restraining order and 
kidnapped her children; during the several hours the police ignored her 
calls, her husband killed the children.112 The Court reiterated that she 
did not have a right to protection and thus could not claim a due process 
violation.113 
All of these cases exacerbate the problem of underenforcement in 
minority communities. That minority communities do not receive the 
same protection from the police that other communities receive might 
be unfair. But it is not actionable under the due process clause. Nor is it 
likely to fare better under the equal protection clause, given the Court’s 
decisions in United States v. Armstrong,114 which required plaintiffs to 
meet the exacting burden of establishing that similarly situated 
individuals of a different race were treated differently and that such 
different treatment was motivated by a discriminatory purpose;115 and in 
McCleskey v. Kemp,116 which essentially insulated unequal treatment 
from review in deference to prosecutorial discretion.117 In a society of 
negative rights,118 the Court has made it clear that minorities should not 
expect recourse through the judicial system. 
 
 109. Id. at 195. Although DeShaney involved the failure of a state agency to protect a child 
from abuse, the Court’s holding was broad. The Court stated that “nothing in the language of 
the Due Process Clause itself requires the state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its 
citizens against invasion by private actors.” Id. 
 110. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 111. The suit was brought by Jessica Gonzales, who identifies as “a Latina and Native 
woman[.]” See Testimony of Jessica Lenahan, INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 5 
(Oct. 22, 2008), http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-
institute/files/Gonzalesdocs/jess%20statement%20merits%20hearing.pdf [https://perma.cc
/P9LA-DYFW].  
 112. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768–69 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“did not create a system by which police departments [can be] generally held financially 
accountable for crimes that better policing might have prevented”); see also David A. 
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1280–87 (1999) (describing traditional 
view that police protection is immune from due process claims). 
 113. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768. 
 114. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).  
 115. See id. at 465. 
 116. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 117. See id. at 297. 
 118. The negative rights theory to constitutionalism, which the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly endorsed, posits that the state is under no constitutional obligation to provide 
services to its polity. See Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the 
Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 983 (1996) (quoting Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 
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It is the Court’s role in enabling racial profiling, however, that has 
had the most pernicious effect on unequal policing. Consider Terry v. 
Ohio.119 The issue before the Warren Court was a straightforward one: 
Did the police violate the Fourth Amendment when they detained Terry 
and his companion, both African-American,120 in the absence of 
probable cause to believe that they had committed a crime?121 On its 
face, such a seizure of Terry and his companion—an officer had 
observed them engaged in the noncriminal act of peering in a store 
window—would seem to violate the Fourth Amendment, which at the 
time was understood as requiring probable cause as the predicate to a 
search or seizure.122 To get around this hurdle, the Court began one of its 
earliest shifts to focusing on the reasonableness clause of the Fourth 
Amendment.123 By doing so, the Court was able to assert that the Fourth 
Amendment, rather than containing a blanket probable cause 
requirement, permitted courts to balance the needs of the police against 
the intrusions to the individual.124 With this judicial legerdemain, the 
Court noted rising crime rates and used that as a justification to permit 
officers to conduct forcible stops, even in the absence of probable 
cause.125 Rather, a standard less than probable cause—a standard 
entirely absent from the text of the Fourth Amendment—would 
 
F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)) (describing the negative liberties approach to 
constitutionalism). 
 119. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 120. Interestingly, the Court made no mention of the race of Terry or his companion. 
Even if race was not surfaced, however, it was clearly just below the surface. For an analysis of 
the Court’s decision to elide race in Terry, see Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual 
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 967–68 (1999). 
 121. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 11. 
 122. It is telling, for example, that the draft opinion Chief Justice Warren circulated to his 
colleagues analyzed the case in terms of whether the officer had probable cause. See John Q. 
Barrett, Terry v. Ohio: The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of Police Stops and Frisks 
Based on Less Than Probable Cause, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 295, 304–05 (Carol 
S. Steiker ed., 2006). Similarly, it is telling that Justice Douglas, in his dissent from the final 
opinion, noted that the majority’s decision was “water[ing] down constitutional guarantees 
and giv[ing] the police the upper hand.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a 
discussion of the Court’s abandonment of the normal probable cause requirement, see Tracey 
Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1278 (1998); see also Paul Butler, “A Long Step Down the Totalitarian 
Path”: Justice Douglas’s Great Dissent in Terry v. Ohio, 79 MISS. L.J. 9, 22 (2009) (noting that 
the court declined to apply the relatively high standard of probable cause in Terry). 
 123. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–37 
(1967)); Butler, supra note 122, at 20–21 (discussing the shift to a “reasonable suspicion” 
standard in Terry). 
 124. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21. 
 125. See id. at 23–24.  
95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017) 
2017] RACE, POLICING, AND TECHNOLOGY 1261 
suffice.126 So long as an officer could articulate reasonable suspicion to 
believe that “criminal activity may be afoot[,]” the officer could conduct 
a forcible limited detention.127 The Court used a similar concern about 
crime and officer safety to justify another watering down of the Fourth 
Amendment: if the officer also had reasonable suspicion that a person 
was armed or dangerous, the officer could add a pat down for 
weapons—in other words, a stop and frisk.128 
Importantly, in deciding Terry as it did, the Court explicitly 
recognized that stop-and-frisk practices were not race neutral and that 
its Terry decision was likely to have a disproportionate impact on racial 
minorities.129 Indeed, the reason the officer focused on Terry and his 
companion and concluded that “they just didn’t look right to me at the 
time”130 likely had much to do with race.131 However, this was a trade off 
the Court was willing to make. In weighing the needs of the police on 
one side and the privacy interests of racial minorities and goal of race-
blind policing on the other, the Court came down on the side of the 
police. Indeed, lest there be any doubt that there was a police exception 
to the notion that the state should be color blind, the Court clarified this 
point a few years later: the police may consider race and ethnicity in 
 
 126. In emphasizing reasonableness, the Court engaged in doctrinal drift, allowing a 
reasonableness approach that it had just adopted in the administrative search context in 
Camara, 387 U.S. 523, to find a home in the law enforcement context. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
As Joshua Dressler and Alan Michaels have written of this adoption, “[i]f Camara cracked the 
Fourth Amendment monolith, Terry v. Ohio broke it entirely.” See 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & 
ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §	17.01, at 277–79 (4th ed. 
2006). 
 127. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 128. Id. at 27. 
 129. See id. at 14 n.11. The Court noted: 
While the frequency with which “frisking” forms a part of field interrogation practice 
varies tremendously with the locale, the objective of the interrogation, and the 
particular officer it cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in police-
community tensions. This is particularly true in situations where the “stop and frisk” 
of youths or minority group members is “motivated by the officers’ perceived need to 
maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by 
humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets.” 
Id. (quoting LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY, DONALD M. MCINTYRE, JR. & DANIEL L. 
ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 47–48 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1967). 
 130. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), 1967 WL 93600, at 
*6. 
 131. That race likely played a role in the stop in Terry has not been lost on other 
commentators. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal 
Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1574 (2011) (noting that “it is not unreasonable to 
conclude Officer[] McFadden’s comments were racially inflected”). See generally Thompson, 
supra note 120 (providing an overview of the use of race under the Terry standard). 
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deciding whom to stop during border stops.132 Many lower courts have 
interpreted this case to permit the use of race as a factor in stop-and-
frisk decisions.133 
Equally important, in embracing a standard far weaker than 
probable cause, and one that only need be articulated ex post, the Court 
implicitly sanctioned a category that is “so malleable that reasonable 
suspicion is often reconfigured into whatever a law enforcement officer 
wants it to be at any given moment.”134 This weak standard has been a 
windfall to law enforcement officers, who can and do categorize almost 
anything as suspicious. Justice Thurgood Marshall observed as much 
when he noted that the Drug Enforcement Administration’s drug 
courier profile could apply to almost anyone agents wanted to stop 
without discrimination based on the type of ticket the passenger had 
purchased, the amount of luggage the passenger carried, where the 
passenger was seated on the plane, or how the passenger behaved.135 
There is one further problem with Terry that scholars have only 
recently begun to analyze. In creating an articulable reasonable 
suspicion standard,136 the Court failed to foresee that its malleable 
standard would result not only in individual stops and frisks that could 
be separately analyzed for their constitutionality but also the wholesale 
 
 132. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563–64 (1976) (allowing race as a 
permissible factor in conducting border stops); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 
886–87 (1975) (also allowing race as a permissible factor in conducting border stops). 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. Pena-Cantu, 639 F.2d 1228, 1228–29 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(discussing how officers stopped vehicles containing entirely adult male Hispanics); United 
States v. Hernandez-Lopez, 538 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing how an officer 
stopped a driver because he was dressed “like a Mexican cowboy”); United States v. Travis, 
837 F. Supp. 1386, 1391 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (discussing how officers believed that focusing on 
minorities was an effective use of law enforcement resources). For a discussion of lower courts 
permitting the use of race as a factor in stop-and-frisk decisions, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race 
and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 232–33 (1983); L. Song Richardson, 
Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2068–69 (2011); Randall 
S. Susskind, Note, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
324, 336–38 (1994). For a sampling of cases allowing the use of racial incongruity as a factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion, see Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 17, at 66 
n.148. 
 134. Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, supra note 17, at 860. 
 135. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing 
over a dozen federal cases that fit the DEA’s broad drug courier profile, including instances 
where “suspect was first to deplane[,]” the “last to deplane[,]” or “deplaned from the middle”; 
where suspects had “one-way tickets[,]” “round-trip tickets[,]” “non-stop flights[,]” or 
“changed planes”; suspects with “no luggage” or “new suitcases”; suspects who were 
“traveling alone” or “traveling with [a] companion”; and suspects who “acted nervously” or 
“acted calmly”). 
 136. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  
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use of such tactics across entire communities.137 It is the systemic use of 
stops and frisks that are the problem du jour. What was really at issue in 
New York City, for example, was not so much the constitutionality of 
individual stops, or stops at the retail level. Rather, the problem was an 
entire program, referred to as New York’s aggressive stop-and-frisk 
policy, instituted as a top-down approach and supported by then-Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg and then-Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly.138 
As Tracy Meares observes, these are “programmatic stops	.	.	.	imposed 
from the top down” on a massive scale.139 Terry, as a case, is still 
inadequate for addressing this problem. And this is to say nothing of 
inefficiency of stop and frisk as a police tactic140 or evidence that stop-
and-frisk policing could even contribute to an increase in law breaking 
rather than a diminution.141 
Terry, however, was not the Court’s only decision to contribute to 
racialized policing and sacrifice the privacy interests of racial minorities. 
Equally detrimental was its decision in Whren v. United States.142 Faced 
 
 137. See Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of 
Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162 (2015).  
 138. See Michael Bloomberg, ‘Stop and Frisk’ Keeps New York Safe, WASH. POST (Aug. 
18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-bloomberg-stop-and-frisk-
keeps-new-york-safe/2013/08/18/8d4cd8c4-06cf-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html?utm_term
=.ea89ff51f6e9 [https://perma.cc/KR5K-NKQ7]; Jessica Chasmar, NYPD Commissioner 
Raymond Kelly Defends ‘Essential’ Stop-and-Frisk, WASH. TIMES (July 23, 2013), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/23/nypd-commissioner-raymond-kelly-defends-essential-/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ9V-JVQN]. 
 139. Meares, supra note 137, at 162.  
 140. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop-and-
Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 
15), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2845540 [https://perma.cc/WH9S-
GBEX (staff-uploaded archive)] (reviewing studies and concluding that the “empirical case 
for a crime-control benefit from [stop-and-frisk practices]	.	.	.	does not stand on strong 
foundations”). 
 141. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, 
Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1282 (2004) (observing that “racial profiling on the highways may well 
increase the amount of profiled crime and costs associated with police searches, resulting in 
numerically more white motorists offending because of a perceived sense of immunity”); see 
also K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive 
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 271 (2009) 
(demonstrating that aggressive policing could ultimately be criminogenic in part because of 
legitimacy failures and that victims of profiling will perceive the system as illegitimate and feel 
less obligated to obey the law). For a discussion of how aggressive policing in general can 
increase crime, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at 
a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 338 (2011) (“[T]he local policing practices currently favored in much of 
America not only have hidden costs for effective crime prevention but also can directly 
undermine sound responses to the threat of terrorism.”). 
 142. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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with a case in which vice-squad officers observed two black men in a 
Pathfinder, decided to follow them, and pulled them over after 
observing them turn without signaling, the Court held that it was 
irrelevant whether the police stopped the vehicle on a pretext.143 Writing 
for the entire Court, Justice Scalia concluded that the subjective 
motivations of the officers, even if race based,144 are irrelevant under the 
Fourth Amendment.145 Rather, so long as the traffic stop itself is based 
on a traffic violation, such stops will be permissible.146 In doing so, the 
Court gave another windfall to law enforcement officers and dealt 
another blow to the notion of race-free policing.147 Indeed, the law 
enforcement community quickly hailed Whren as a victory and adopted 
police tactics to maximize the decision’s impact.148 The police training 
manual, Tactics for Criminal Patrol, reflects this adoption.149 In its 
“Criminal Patrol Pyramid,” the manual instructs officers to do the 
following: 
1. Develop suspicion (or, typically, merely curiosity) about a 
driver. 
2. Discover a legal justification to stop the driver (typically this 
justification is some minor violation of the traffic laws or 
vehicle code), and make the stop. 
3. Decide, after making the stop, whether to seek to search the 
vehicle based on the close observation of the vehicle and its 
 
 143. See id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”). 
 144. The Court suggested that racial animus or discrimination, irrelevant to a Fourth 
Amendment claim, might be relevant to a claim based on the equal protection clause. Id. 
However, given the hurdles the Court has erected to frustrate equal protection claims, 
including a discovery hurdle erected the same term as Whren, this alternative route is 
practically impassable. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468–71 (1996) (requiring 
that defendants seeking discovery to show a pattern of racial discrimination first provide 
actual evidence consistent with race-based decision making); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine 
Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1860–61 (2004). 
 145. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.  
 146. See id. at 810. 
 147. See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 340 
(1998). 
 148. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDER-
MARKEL, PULLED OVER 35 (2014). Law enforcement responded to Whren with increased 
enrollments in training to use profiles in connection with pretext stops; one California 
highway patrol training officer was quoted as saying, “After Whren the game was over. We 
won.” Id.; see also Carbado, supra note 18 (manuscript at 155–56); Kenneth Gavsie, Note, 
Making the Best of “Whren”: The Problems with Pretextual Traffic Stops and the Need for 
Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV. 385, 394 (1998) (positing that “law enforcement has taken full 
advantage of the Court's liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Whren”). 
 149. See CHARLES REMSBERG, TACTICS FOR CRIMINAL PATROL: VEHICLE STOPS, 
DRUG DISCOVERY AND OFFICER SURVIVAL 9 (1995).  
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visible contents and dialogue with the driver (and 
passengers). Officers use this dialogue to assess the 
truthfulness of the driver. 
4. Search the vehicle (“usually by consent”). 
5. Discover contraband and weapons. 
6. Make an arrest. 
7. Seek “bonus benefits” (forfeiture of vehicles, cash, etc.; 
information about additional criminal offenses).150 
There is a final case worth mentioning that normalized and gave 
legitimacy to racialized policing. That case is United States v. 
Mendenhall,151 which introduced the Court’s “free to leave” test.152 
Faced with the question of whether the police stop of Sylvia 
Mendenhall, a young woman disembarking from a flight at the Detroit 
Metropolitan Airport, was an unconstitutional stop because the police 
lacked either probable cause or even reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, Justice Stewart ruled that the Fourth Amendment was simply 
inapplicable.153 Creating the fiction154 that a reasonable person would 
have felt “free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on 
her way,”155 Justice Stewart wrote that the Fourth Amendment was not 
implicated at all, since as a matter of law there was never a seizure.156 It 
was no excuse that the police officer never advised Sylvia Mendenhall, 
whom the Court described as “a female and a Negro,”157 that she was 
free to leave.158 The putative reasonable person, apparently civic-
 
 150. See id. at 9. 
 151. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
 152. See id. at 554. 
 153. See id. at 555. 
 154. See Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The 
Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 
38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 521–22 (2001) (describing the “free to leave” test as involving a 
legal fiction since few individuals would in fact feel free to leave when accosted by a police 
officer); cf. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 153 (describing the “free to leave” test). Alice Ristroph adds that, in 
viewing such encounters as consensual, courts tend to ignore the unstated power of the 
officers’ position as an agent of the state. See Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A 
Counter-Narrative to Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1611–16 
(2015). This position tips the balance of power, rendering fictional the notion that most 
individuals feel on equal footing such to refuse a request. See id. 
 155. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. 
 156. See id. at 558. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 555 (“Our conclusion that no seizure occurred is not affected by the fact that 
the respondent was not expressly told by the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate 
with their inquiry, for the voluntariness of her responses does not depend upon her having 
been so informed.”). Although the Court acknowledged that the encounter might “reasonably 
have appeared coercive to the respondent, who was 22 years old and had not been graduated 
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educated and schooled in the Fourth Amendment, would simply know 
this. The Court extended and broadened this “free to leave” test in 
subsequent cases such as Florida v. Bostick,159 United States v. Drayton,160 
and INS v. Delgado.161 As a result, many police stops and the 
accompanying questions—“Where are you going?” “Do you live 
nearby?” “Are you visiting someone here?” “Can I see some 
identification?”—are no longer categorized as stops regulated by the 
Fourth Amendment at all but rather are deemed consensual 
encounters.162 Consider what this means. In the context of stop-and-frisk 
data, for example, the data tell us virtually nothing about the number of 
 
from high school[,]” id. at 558, the Court’s subsequent decisions have de-emphasized, or 
ignored entirely, similar characteristics. For example, in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 
(1991), in which the Court intimated that a youth on a bus was “free to leave” when 
confronted by an officer, id. at 432, the majority made no mention of Bostick’s race at all. One 
has to read the dissent to find any indication that Bostick was black. See id. at 441 n.1 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), the Court concluded that 
when between twenty and thirty federal agents entered a factory and conducted a sweep to 
check the immigration status of factory workers, the workers were free to leave 
notwithstanding that the agents were armed, carried handcuffs, and manned the exits. Id. at 
212–13. At no point does the Court address the role that ethnicity, class, or even immigration 
status might have played in whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Joshua 
Dressler and Alan C. Michaels’ observation about the race language in Mendenhall is 
revealing. Dressler and Michaels note that ultimately the Justices “concluded that the racial 
aspects of the case were not determinative, and the Court has never found them so in the 
quarter century since.” DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 126, at §	7.03(C)(3), at 116. 
 159. 501 US. 429, 435–37 (1991) (suggesting that youth who was confronted by two 
sheriff’s deputies who boarded a bus to question passengers was not seized since a reasonable 
person would have felt free “to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter”). 
 160. 536 U.S. 194, 197–98, 207 (2002) (noting that bus passenger who was questioned when 
three officers entered a bus—one remaining near the exit while a second stood at the back of 
the bus—was not seized since a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or terminate 
the encounter). 
 161. 466 U.S. 210, 212–13, 218 (1984) (discussing how factory workers were not seized 
even though several federal agents entered factory, blocked exits, and conducted an 
immigration sweep, since the factory workers were not seized since a reasonable person would 
have felt free to discontinue contact with the federal agents). 
 162. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (stating that officer’s continued 
questioning of driver after issuing a warning deemed a consensual encounter and thus did not 
require legal justification). As Devon Carbado recently observed, it matters little that actual 
reasonable people would not feel free to leave or that they could terminate the encounter: 
“[T]he free-to-leave framework is a normative inquiry rhetorically disguised as an empirical 
one.” Carbado, supra note 18 (manuscript at 118). The test becomes even more problematic 
when race and class are added to the equation. Cynthia Lee has been even more blunt in 
stating “[a] young black male who has grown up in South Central Los Angeles knows that if 
he is stopped by a police officer, he should do whatever the officer says and not talk back 
unless he wants to kiss the ground.” Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of 
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1152 (2012). 
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individuals who were deemed consensually encountered.163 And once 
again, since officers do not need probable cause or even reasonable 
suspicion, the brunt of such encounters is disproportionately 
experienced by racial minorities, who are often deemed “always 
already” criminal.164 
None of this is to say that the Court’s role in subordinating the goal 
of equality before the law to law enforcement objectives always goes 
unacknowledged. Consider Justice Stevens’s candid dissent in California 
v. Acevedo,165 a case essentially reaffirming the authority of police 
officers to search cars without a warrant:166 
In the years [from 1982 to 1991], the Court has heard argument in 
30 Fourth Amendment cases involving narcotics. In all but one, 
the government was the petitioner. All save two involved a search 
or seizure without a warrant or with a defective warrant. And, in 
all except three, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
search or seizure. 
In the meantime, the flow of narcotics cases through the courts 
has steadily and dramatically increased. No impartial observer 
could criticize this Court for hindering the progress of the war on 
drugs. On the contrary, decisions like the one the Court makes 
 
 163. For example, officers with the City of New York Police Department are required to 
document “forcible” stops for data-collection purposes, but there is no requirement that they 
document consensual encounters. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., STOP AND FRISK 
REPORT 63 (2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp
_frsk.pdf [https://perma.cc/55VP-EFG4]; see also Ristroph, supra note 82 (manuscript at 16 
n.57) (noting that many jurisdictions “do not track stops, let alone	.	.	.	near-seizures,” 
Ristroph’s term for consensual encounters); Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York 
City, Chapter 5: Stop, Question, and Frisk, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS (Aug. 2000), http://
www.usccr.gov/pubs/nypolice/ch5.htm [https://perma.cc/MR3R-D4FJ] (“Accordingly, if a 
person is stopped and questioned without official use of force and gives his or her name, a 
UF-250 is not required, provided that the individual is neither frisked nor arrested by NYPD 
officers.”).  
 164. For a discussion of what it means to be “always already” criminal, see Frank Rudy 
Cooper, We Are Always Already Imprisoned: Hyper-Incarceration and Black Male Identity 
Performance, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1185, 1187–88 (2013) (discussing disparities in policing of men 
of color and stating that “[t]he mainstream’s depiction of black men as always already 
imprisoned disciplines us into the never-finished quest to prove we are a ‘Good Black Man,’ 
rather than a ‘Bad Black Man’	”). See also LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY 85, 119 (2001) (“[I]deology has always-already 
interpellated individuals as subjects,	.	.	.	Hence individuals are ‘abstract’ with respect to the 
subjects which they always-already are.”). 
 165. 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that police can search a container within a car if they 
have probable cause to believe that container holds evidence of a crime). 
 166. See id. at 573.  
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today will support the conclusion that this Court has become a 
loyal foot soldier in the Executive’s fight against crime.167 
Such honesty and transparency, however, are rare. More often, the 
Court’s role in facilitating unequal and racialized policing goes 
unnoticed and unremarked upon. 
To be sure, there are many more cases that reflect the Court’s 
juridical subordination of equality goals. In the end though, everything, 
including Whren and Mendenhall, is traceable to Terry. Terry, after all, is 
the case in which the Court most significantly began its shift from a 
warrant-centric view of the Fourth Amendment to a reasonableness-
centric view.168 More importantly, it is the case in which the Warren 
Court, long viewed as a champion of defendant rights,169 first began to 
sacrifice those individual rights, including the right to equal treatment 
before the law, in favor of the interests of law enforcement and crime 
control.170 As I wrote some years ago, “[I]f the Fourth Amendment itself 
has a poisonous tree, its name is Terry v. Ohio.”171 
II.  RACE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE WAY WE COULD POLICE 
TOMORROW 
The racialized policing problems discussed above—police violence, 
underenforcement, and racial profiling—are not unsolvable. However, 
given the Court’s role in enabling the state of affairs we are in, the 
solution I am proposing has little to do with seeking recourse through 
courts. Instead, it has everything to do with technology, specifically with 
harnessing technology in ways that can deracialize policing. Though I 
will return to the problems of police violence and underenforcement, I 
begin below with technology that can combat racial profiling. The cost, 
again, is that there will be more policing, not less. The cost, too, is that 
 
 167. Id. at 600–01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 168. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §	18.01, at 291–
93 (3d ed. 2002).  
 169. See A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 
249, 254 (1968). As described by Earl Dudley, the law clerk who worked for Chief Justice 
Warren on Terry v. Ohio, external factors played a significant role in the outcome of the case. 
See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law 
Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 892–93 (1998). Not only was there civil unrest 
in many cities, but in addition, the Court had been a target during the 1964 presidential 
campaign for defending individual rights at the expense of law enforcement and was expected 
to become a target again in the 1968 campaign. Id. For more on the attacks against the Court 
at the time, see FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 8–15 (1970). 
 170. For a contrary view, see Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in 
Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (arguing that the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure cases were not marked by egalitarianism). 
 171. Capers, supra note 9, at 32. 
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many Americans will have to surrender some of the privacy they now 
enjoy. The technology I have in mind might rile civil libertarians and 
progressives, and even some black folk. But again, hear me out. Allow 
me to again channel Ralph Ellison’s nameless narrator: “[b]ear with 
me.”172 
I mentioned earlier that the police in New York City recorded 4.4 
million forcible stops between 2004 and 2012, and that over eighty-three 
percent of those stopped were either black or brown, a number far 
greater than their representation in the population.173 But these numbers 
tell only part of the story. As statistician and criminologist Jeffrey Fagan 
noted, the percentage of black and brown people stopped is high even 
after accounting for crime rates.174 Other numbers speak to what I have 
termed “Terry innocen[ce.]”175 For every twenty individuals stopped, a 
full nineteen were found not to be engaged in activity warranting an 
arrest.176 In other words, the error rate was around ninety-five percent. 
And even this understates the true error rate, since research has shown 
that nearly half of all arrests resulting from these stop-and-frisk 
encounters do not result in a conviction.177 The error rate rises even 
more, spectacularly more, when one considers the oft-stated objective of 
aggressive stop-and-frisk practices: to get illegal firearms out of the 
hands of criminals.178 According to the NYPD’s own data, officers find 
one firearm for every 1,000 stops, which translates into an error rate of 
over 99.9%.179 To put this in perspective, this result is on par with the 
 
 172. See ELLISON, supra note 10, at 12.  
 173. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see supra 
note 86 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 3, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08-CV-
01034), http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Expert_Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6TWL-4NZ3].  
 175. I use the term “Terry innocent” to describe the individuals who are not found to be 
engaged in criminal activity warranting an arrest. Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal 
Assists, supra note 17 (manuscript at 32 n.163). 
 176. Cf. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. at 558 (concluding that only around six percent of all forcible 
stops resulted in an arrest). It is possible that even Justice Scalia would have found this 
accuracy rate unacceptable. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1695 (2014) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (suggesting that a hit rate of less than five percent, or one in twenty, would be 
insufficient to justify reasonable suspicion). 
 177. See ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., A REPORT 
ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-
FRISK PRACTICES 3, 10 fig.7 (Nov. 2013), https://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT
_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_NOV_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HEE-LMNE]. 
 178. RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI & WILLIAM J. BRATTON, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 1: 
GETTING GUNS OFF THE STREETS OF NEW YORK 3 (1994); Barry Paddock, Kelly: Stop-and-
Frisk Saves Lives, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york
/kelly-stop-and-frisk-saves-lives-article-1.1306828 [https://perma.cc/T3RX-ECRJ]. 
 179. Paddock, supra note 178. 
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success rate for when officers engage in purely random searches.180 
Moreover, evidence suggests that racialized policing, rather than 
contributing to accuracy, adds to error. In New York, for example, 
stopped blacks were actually less likely to have a weapon than stopped 
whites.181 In Maryland, the “hit rate” was also lower for searched blacks 
than for searched whites.182 Similar results come from New Jersey, where 
troopers found evidence of criminal activity in 13% of their searches of 
black motorists compared to in 25% of their searches of white 
motorists.183 
The foregoing suggests more than merely a racialized policing 
problem in which “[s]kin color becomes evidence[.]”184 It points to more 
than what social scientists have long confirmed: that we all suffer from 
biases, and many of those biases are about race and criminality.185 It 
suggests more than simply the fact that stop-and-frisk practices have a 
breadth that disproportionately affects those who are Terry innocent. It 
suggests a fundamental flaw with the way we police now, a flaw that 
undermines, with every racially inflected look, encounter, stop, or frisk, 
our protestations that we are all equal before the law. Instead of a color-
blind government, it suggests a color-dependent government. It is 
certainly at odds with Chief Justice Roberts’ insistence that “[t]he way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the 
basis of race.”186 
In critical race theory, it is not uncommon to invoke the trope of 
using the master’s tools “to dismantle the master’s house[.]”187 Here, I 
 
 180. See Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D at 35, Floyd v. City of New 
York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08-CV-01034), http://ccrjustice.org/sites
/default/files/assets/files/FaganSecondSupplementalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNA3-
P5AQ]. 
 181. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 661 n.760. 
 182. See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 80 (2002). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Harris, supra note 83, at 268. 
 185. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and 
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004) (describing how study 
participants classified positive words faster after seeing the word “White” than after seeing 
the word “Black”); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual 
Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881 (2004) (noting that participants 
who saw a black face were quicker to identify “crime-relevant objects” than those who saw 
none); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1508–14 (2005) 
(summarizing studies that measure bias in racial meanings); Richardson, supra note 133, at 
2036 (“The science of implicit social cognition	.	.	.	can contribute much to the understanding of 
police behavior, especially as it relates to the treatment of nonwhites.”). 
 186. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
 187. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially-Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal 
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680 (1995) (“Through jury nullification, I want to dismantle 
the master’s house with the master’s tools.”). Interestingly, the source of the trope posited the 
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have little interest in the tools of law, especially since those tools are 
ultimately in the control of a Court that routinely subordinates the 
interests of those who are black and brown to the interests of those who 
are not. But I am interested in another tool: technology. Specifically, I 
am interested in the way technology can deracialize and de-bias policing. 
I am interested in the way technology can say to those who claim that 
racial biases are inevitable in policing, “Think again.” I am interested in 
technology that will lay bare not only the truth of how we police now but 
also how those of us who are black or brown live now. 
What I am advocating for first are more public surveillance 
cameras. I say more because already there are many.188 Public 
surveillance cameras are already integral to law enforcement. For 
example, New York City aggregates and analyzes data from 
approximately 3,000 surveillance cameras around the city and allows the 
police to scan license plates, cross-check criminal databases, measure 
radiation levels, “and more[.]”189 Washington, D.C., is in the process of 
consolidating over 5,000 cameras into one network called the Video 
Interoperability for Public Safety.190 Chicago, with at least 2,250 
surveillance cameras, has Operation Virtual Shield, which includes 
biometric technology.191 Baltimore has CitiWatch, which includes over 
400 cameras equipped with low light, pan, tilt, and zoom capabilities.192 
 
opposite, that the master’s tools can never destroy the master’s house. See AUDRE LORDE, 
The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 110, 110–
12 (1984). 
 188. See Steve Henn, In More Cities, a Camera on Every Corner, Park and Sidewalk, NPR 
(June 20, 2013, 2:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/06/20/191603369
/The-Business-Of-Surveillance-Cameras [https://perma.cc/A29W-PLCL]. 
 189. See Joe Coscarelli, The NYPD’s Domain Awareness System Is Watching You, N.Y. 
MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 9, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer
/2012/08/nypd-domain-awareness-system-microsoft-is-watching-you.html [https://perma.cc
/CQ83-BEXK]; Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Million Super 
Computer System That Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License Plate Readers and Crime 
Reports, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 8:50 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-
unveils-new-40-million-super-computer-system-data-network-cameras-license-plate-readers-
crime-reports-article-1.1132135 [https://perma.cc/P3EB-A4XW]. 
 190. D.C. Police Set to Monitor 5000 Cameras, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/apr/9/dc-police-set-to-monitor-5000-cameras/ [https://perma
.cc/D7F9-PFCM]. 
 191. BILGE YESIL, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: POWER AND PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 38 
(2009). Biometric technology uses physical and behavioral features to identify and monitor 
individuals. See Definition of Biometrics, BIOMETRICS INST. (2017), http://www
.biometricsinstitute.org/pages/definition-of-biometrics.html [https://perma.cc/D5PK-BQYL]. 
Examples include the use of retina scans, voice recognition, and surveillance cameras that 
identify an individual by his gait. See Types of Biometrics, BIOMETRICS INST. (2017), http://
www.biometricsinstitute.org/pages/types-of-biometrics.html [https://perma.cc/4BLQ-857W]. 
 192. YESIL, supra note 191, at 35. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017) 
1272 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
Finally, consider this description of the Real Time Crime Center in 
Fresno, California: 
On 57 monitors that cover the walls of the center, operators 
zoomed and panned an array of roughly 200 police cameras 
perched across the city. They could dial up 800 more feeds from 
the city’s schools and traffic cameras, and they soon hope to add 
400 more streams from cameras worn on officers’ bodies and from 
thousands of local businesses that have surveillance systems.193 
Even small towns have turned to surveillance cameras. A survey 
from just over a decade ago listed over 200 towns in thirty-seven states 
that were either using or planning to use public surveillance cameras.194 
But for the most part, these cameras tend to be clustered in communities 
that are poor, black and brown,195 or at the opposite extreme, areas that 
 
 193. Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat 
‘Score’, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-
new-way-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-
11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html [https://perma.cc/DR3A-2DAX]. 
 194. See Lisa Hoffman, Under Surveillance: Government Spy Cameras Proliferate, PRISON 
PLANET (June 22, 2006), http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/june2006/230606Surveillance
.htm [https://perma.cc/GBK4-8GNR] (“A Scripps Howard News Service tally found that at 
least 200 towns and cities in 37 states now employ video cameras—or are in the process of 
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locales.”); see also Matt Cagle, Communities Under Surveillance, ACLU N. CAL. (Nov. 21, 
2014), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/communities-under-surveillance-california [https://perma
.cc/HA9G-NPZR] (noting that “surveillance technology is frequently and disproportionately 
used on minority communities without their knowledge or consent”); N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, WHO’S WATCHING? VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE 
NEED FOR PUBLIC OVERSIGHT 5, 10 (2006), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files
/publications/nyclu_pub_whos_watching.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6Q8-G3SG] (noting that 
surveillance cameras are used in a manner that targets people based on race and that 3,100 
surveillance cameras operated by the NYPD’s VIPER unit are focused on communities of 
color); Charlie Savage, US Doles Out Millions for Street Cameras, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 12, 
2007), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/08/12/us_doles_out_millions
_for_street_cameras/ [https://perma.cc/WNU6-TB6F] (“The Department of Homeland Security 
is funneling millions of dollars to local governments nationwide for purchasing high-tech 
video camera networks	.	.	.	.”). 
 195. See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 194, at 10; see also Cameras Installed at 
Bridgeport Public Housing, NEWS 12 CONN. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://connecticut.news12.com
/news/security-cameras-installed-at-bridgeport-public-housing-complexes-1.11610221 [https://
perma.cc/S29E-FTNP]; Megan Cottrell, Will 3,000 Cameras Make Chicago’s Public Housing 
Safer, CHICAGONOW: ONE STORY UP (July 20, 2009, 7:55 AM), http://www.chicagonow.com
/blogs/one-story-up/2009/07/will-3000-cameras-make-chicagos-public-housing-safer.html [https://
perma.cc/4E47-PUH5]; Alice Speri, Newark Public Housing Installs Surveillance Cameras as 
Part of Massive Security Initiative, N.J.COM (Aug. 21, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://www.nj.com
/news/index.ssf/2011/08/newark_public_housing_boosts_s.html [https://perma.cc/C6QC-
CV5U]. This contemporary racialized surveillance has prompted cultural scholar John Fiske 
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Black Man and Democratic Totalitarianism, 15 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y 67, 69 (1998). 
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are rich and that the state wants to protect from an entirely different 
group of brown folk. By this, I mean that cameras are most prevalent in 
areas around public housing projects and around potential terrorist 
targets such as the New York Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board of 
Trade, Times Square, and Washington, D.C.196 But cameras should not 
be limited to these areas. Cameras, like CCTV in Britain,197 should be 
extended to virtually all public spaces. If we are going to watch some 
people, then all of us should be watched. 
Along with public surveillance cameras, law enforcement should 
add facial recognition technology, which is already in use by over fifty 
police departments198 and is at the center of the FBI’s Next Generation 
Identification Project, which has been “creating a trove of fingerprints, 
iris scans, data from facial recognition software and other sources.”199 
The technology should not only be limited to comparing faces to 
available arrest photos but also to driver’s license photos and photos on 
social media sites like Facebook and Instagram. And law enforcement 
should add access to “Big Data”200 to the equation. Already the 
 
 196. See, e.g., Chicago Expands Surveillance Cameras Network, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 
15, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/15/chicago-expands-surveilla_n_877681
.html [https://perma.cc/FJG3-GM92] (surveillance at the Chicago Board of Trade); Suzanne 
Choney, Lawmakers Want More Surveillance on the Ground—and in the Sky, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 20, 2013), https://usnews.newsvine.com/_news/2013/04/20/17830619-lawmakers-want-
more-surveillance-on-the-ground-and-in-the-sky [https://perma.cc/P6TY-KV3P] (surveillance 
in Washington, D.C.); Chris Francescani, NYPD Expands Surveillance Network to Fight 
Crime as Well as Terrorism, REUTERS (June 21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-ny-
surveillance-idUSL2N0EV0D220130621 [https://perma.cc/64XK-MUMT] (surveillance at the 
New York Stock Exchange). 
 197. David Barrett, One Surveillance Camera for Every 11 People in Britain, Says CCTV 
Survey, TELEGRAPH (July 10, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology
/10172298/One-surveillance-camera-for-every-11-people-in-Britain-says-CCTV-survey.html 
[https://perma.cc/HH7M-XFRP]. 
 198. Sabrina A. Lochner, Note, Saving Face: Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Mobile 
Facial Recognition Technology & Iris Scans, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 202 (2013). 
 199. Jouvenal, supra note 193. 
 200. Defining “Big Data” is notoriously difficult. The technical definition usually 
constrains Big Data to “[w]here the data volume, acquisition velocity, or data representation 
limits the ability to perform effective analysis using traditional relational approaches or 
requires the use of significant horizontal scaling for efficient processing.” Frank Konkel, 
Sketching the Big Picture on Big Data, FCW (Apr. 15, 2013), http://fcw.com/articles/2013/04/15
/big-experts-on-big-data.aspx?m=1 [https://perma.cc/VUJ4-DABJ]; see also Big Data: What It 
Is and Why It Matters, SAS, http://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/big-data/what-is-big-data.html 
[https://perma.cc/2PVJ-A2MT] (“The concept gained momentum in the early 2000s when 
industry analyst Doug Laney articulated the now-mainstream definition of big data as the 
three Vs: Volume[,]	.	.	.	Velocity[,]	.	.	.	[and] Variety.”). More recently, scholars have turned to 
thinking of Big Data as a social phenomenon rather than merely a technical one. See, e.g., Neil 
M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 394 (2014) 
(“We prefer to define big data and big data analytics socially, rather than technically, in terms 
of the broader societal impact	.	.	.	.”). The definition offered in a recent book on Big Data is 
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information available (from credit card transactions to credit history, 
from Facebook likes to Twitter feeds, from favorite bands to favored 
political candidates) is vast. Consider a report from just a few years ago: 
[I]n 2013 the amount of stored information in the world is 
estimated to be about 1,200 exabytes, of which less than 2 percent 
is non-digital.  
There is no way to think about what this size of data means. If it 
were all printed in books, they would cover the entire surface of 
the United States some 52 layers thick. If it were played on CD-
ROMS, and stacked up, they would stretch to the moon in five 
separate piles.201 
Indeed, merely from Facebook alone, which is used by nearly two 
billion people, the accessible information is significant.202 As the 
Washington Post recently reported, Facebook collects ninety-eight data 
points on each of its users.203 As the writer Sue Halpern put it, 
[a]mong this ninety-eight are ethnicity, income, net worth, home 
value, if you are a mom, if you are a soccer mom, if you are 
married, the number of lines of credit you have, if you are 
interested in Ramadan, when you bought your car, and on and on 
and on.204 
Elizabeth Joh adds, “[S]oon it will be feasible and affordable for the 
government to record, store, and analyze nearly everything people 
do.”205 Quite simply, whether it involves tracking location history by 
remotely accessing and analyzing metadata on our phones (including the 
data that “radiate[s]” from our phones and other smart devices),206 or 
 
perhaps useful. It defines Big Data as referring “to things one can do at a large scale that 
cannot be done at a smaller one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways 
that change markets, organizations, the relationship between citizens and governments, and 
more.” VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6 (2013).  
 201. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 200, at 9. 
 202. Caitlin Dewey, 98 Personal Data Points That Facebook Uses to Target Ads to You, 
WASH. POST: INTERSECT (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect
/wp/2016/08/19/98-personal-data-points-that-facebook-uses-to-target-ads-to-you/?utm_term
=.c78ea3701b02 [https://perma.cc/4RH7-6UH9]. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Sue Halpern, They Have, Right Now, Another You, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, (Dec. 22, 
2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/12/22/they-have-right-now-another-you/ [https://
perma.cc/77RY-23SZ]. 
 205. Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, 
and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 15–16 (2016). 
 206. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1, 61–63), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
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accessing surveillance camera data (both public and private), or turning 
to commercial data aggregators, we should give the police technological 
tools so that, with a click of a button, “unknown suspects can be 
known[.]”207 Police departments are already purchasing swaths of 
information about citizens from data analysis firms.208 
Finally, police should be equipped with terahertz scanners. Recall 
that one goal of stop-and-frisk practices is to get firearms out of the 
hands of criminals,209 a goal which has led to the targeting of those of us 
who are black or brown.210 In fact, terahertz scanners, which measure 
terahertz radiation, can scan for concealed weapons without the need for 
a stop or frisk.211 The device is small enough to be placed in a police 
vehicle or even mounted like a surveillance camera.212 As the New York 
City Police Commissioner put it during a public announcement, 
[t]he device reads a specific form of natural energy emitted by 
people and objects known as terahertz. If something is obstructing 
the flow of that radiation, for example a weapon, the device will 
highlight that object. Over the past twelve months, we’ve been 
working with the vendor and the London Metropolitan Police to 
develop a tool that meets our requirements. We took delivery of it 
last week. 
One of our requirements was that the technology must be 
portable	.	.	.	we’re able to mount it in a truck.213 
 
_id=2752788 [https://perma.cc/HJ5A-SCXZ (staff-uploaded archive)] (discussing such data 
and arguing for an “informational curtilage” framework for addressing Fourth Amendment 
concerns). 
 207. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 327, 351 (2015). One can imagine access to data being limited to nonintimate 
information. For a discussion of this possibility, see generally Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, 
and the Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691 (2014) (arguing that data mining poses a 
threat to traditional notions of privacy). 
 208. Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, Forget the NSA, the LAPD Spies on Millions 
of Innocent Folks, L.A. WEEKLY (Feb. 27, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news
/forget-the-nsa-the-lapd-spies-on-millions-of-innocent-folks-4473467 [https://perma.cc/95X2-
5TCT]; Halpern, supra note 204; Quentin Hardy, The Risk to Civil Liberties of Fighting Crime 
with Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/technology/the-
risk-to-civil-liberties-of-fighting-crime-with-big-data.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8BU8-5A3T]. 
 209. GIULIANI & BRATTON, supra note 178, at 3.  
 210. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding 
that police had a policy and practice of targeting black and Hispanic men for forcible stops, in 
violation of the equal protection clause). 
 211. See John Del Signore, NYPD “Takes Delivery” of Portable Body Scanners to Detect 
Concealed Weapons on the Street, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://gothamist.com
/2013/01/23/nypd_takes_delivery_of_van-mounted.php [https://perma.cc/S95N-HG8L]. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. Assuming the device could only reveal the presence of a concealed weapon, using 
the device would not constitute a Fourth Amendment search under current precedent. See 
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To be clear, all of this might sound precariously close to George 
Orwell’s “Big Brother[.]”214 But such technology can also deracialize 
policing. After all, cameras and terahertz scanners do not have implicit 
biases.215 Nor do they suffer from unconscious racism.216 Rather, 
 
generally United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (treating searches that can only 
reveal the presence or absence of contraband as nonsearches under the Fourth Amendment); 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (treating searches that can only reveal the 
presence or absence of contraband as nonsearches). This should be true even where one is 
licensed to carry a firearm, at least in areas where having a license is uncommon, just as 
canine sniffs for narcotics are nonsearches, Place, 462 U.S. at 707, even where one, say, has a 
medical marijuana license. But see Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2015) (arguing that, given expanding protections of the Second Amendment, 
possession of a handgun without more could be inadequate to justify a Fourth Amendment 
stop). 
 214. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 2 (Secker & Warburg 1999) (1949). The specter of 
“Big Brother” has not escaped the Court. In Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1988), a case 
holding that helicopter surveillance of an individual’s back yard was not a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Brennan quoted a passage from 1984 in his 
dissent: 
The black-mustachio’d face gazed down from every commanding corner. There was 
one on the house front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the 
caption said	.	.	.	.	In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, 
hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It 
was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s windows. 
Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting ORWELL, supra, at 2). For an interesting 
discussion of the Big Brother metaphor, see Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer 
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1413–19 (2001). 
 215. Of course, algorithms are only as reliable as the inputs and can reflect the biases of 
their programmers. See Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES: THE 
UPSHOT (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithms-
discriminate.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=Moth-Visible&module=inside-
nyt-region&region=inside-nyt-region&WT.nav=inside-nyt-region&_r=1&abt=0002&abg=1 
[https://perma.cc/83EZ-RPWX]. Sociologist Gary Marx raises another concern: because these 
technologies are often below the radar or invisible, citizens are denied the opportunity to 
complain or offer resistance. See Marx, supra note 19, at 45. This is a weighty problem, and it 
might be that excluding all biases is a Sisyphean endeavor. Relatedly, there is the problem of 
whether the police will selectively deploy such technology in ways that replicate and 
exacerbate unequal policing. See Joh, supra note 205, at 15–16. But certainly any such biases 
and selective use can be minimized and monitored. One such method would be through 
periodic audits along the lines of what Professor Robin Lenhardt and others have proposed in 
the race context. See R. A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1544–50 (2011); cf. 
Jessica Erickson, Racial Impact Statements: Considering the Consequences of Racial 
Disproportionalities in the Criminal Justice System, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1455–56 (2014) 
(describing how “states should consider more concrete standards for data collection”). 
Another possible solution is to solicit more community involvement in the use of 
technologies, a solution for which Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko advocate. See 
Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1846 
(2015) (noting the issues with the lack of availability for public comment or public rulemaking 
regarding police rules). 
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technology can move us closer to real reasonable suspicion. Technology 
can improve policing so that looks, encounters, stops, and frisks turn on 
actual reasonable suspicion of criminality rather than the proxy of race. 
Put differently, having access to at-a-distance weapons scanners, facial 
recognition software, and Big Data can mean the difference between 
“[y]oung	+	[b]lack	.	.	.	=	[p]robable [c]ause”217 and race-blind policing. It 
would certainly mean a drastic reduction in the number of stopped 
minorities and indeed a reduction in the number of all stops. Terahertz 
scanners would tell the police that the bulge in a black teenager’s jacket 
is nothing more than a bulky cellphone, but that white tourist who looks 
like he is from Texas really does have a gun. Facial recognition 
technology combined with Big Data would tell the police that the brown 
driver repeatedly circling the block in fact works in the neighborhood 
and is probably looking for a parking space and that the clean-cut white 
dude reading a paper on a park bench is in fact a sex offender who, just 
by being near a playground, is violating his sex offender registration. It 
would tell the police that the black kid running down the street is simply 
that, a kid running down the street.218 It would tell them, in a way that is 
less intrusive or embarrassing, whether someone is a troublemaker 
casing a neighborhood or a student returning home with a bag of Skittles 
and an iced tea;219 a loiterer up to no good, or a father waiting to pick up 
 
 216. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing unconscious 
racism). Lawrence writes: 
Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and 
beliefs that attach significance to an individual’s race and induce negative feelings and 
opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced 
all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. 
We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our 
beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other 
words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by 
unconscious racial motivation. 
Id. at 322. 
 217. Gaynes, supra note 6, at 621. 
 218. For example, relying solely on “commonsense[,]” the Court has long held that flight 
from police in a high crime area, standing alone, provides reasonable suspicion to justify a 
stop. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). In fact, empirical evidence 
demonstrates the opposite: “that in high-crime urban communities where the population is 
disproportionately minority, flight from an identifiable police officer is a very poor indicator 
that crime is afoot.” See Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent 
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 733, 792 (2000). 
 219. The reference is to Trayvon Martin, the unarmed black youth shot by a neighborhood 
watchman. See Charles M. Blow, Opinion, The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/opinion/blow-the-curious-case-of-
trayvon-martin.html [https://perma.cc/RH59-F3TL]. Access to Big Data, for example, would 
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his children from school;220 a burglar about to commit a home invasion, 
or a Harvard professor entering his own home;221 a thug with a gun, or a 
police chief;222 a trespasser attempting to enter the Capitol Building, or a 
Republican senator;223 a mugger looking for his next victim, or the future 
United States Attorney General;224 a thief about to burgle a laboratory, 
or the world renowned astrophysicist Neil DeGrasse Tyson, guilty only 
of “JBB (just being black).”225 And it would tell that the white kid from 
New Jersey driving into Harlem is not there to score drugs, but to see his 
black girlfriend.226 
I promised earlier to make the argument that deploying technology 
to aid in policing—alarming as it might seem at first—can also play a 
role in tackling the other problems we associate with racialized policing. 
The role public surveillance cameras, weapons scanners, and Big Data 
 
likely have told the police that Martin’s father’s girlfriend lived at the gated community, 
explaining Martin’s presence there. See Edward J. Blakely, In Gated Communities, Such as 
Where Trayvon Martin Died, A Dangerous Mindset, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2012), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-gated-communities-such-as-where-trayvon-martin-died-a-
dangerous-mind-set/2012/04/06/gIQAwWG8zS_story.html?utm_term=.7b3acc664fba [https://
perma.cc/U99C-FDV6]. Had Martin had a history of thefts or break-ins, this too would be 
“known” through technology. For an interesting legal analysis of the shooting and the case 
that followed, see generally Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit 
Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013) (describing the shooting 
and the legal case); see also Cynthia Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
91 (2014) (same). 
 220. See Joanna Rothkoff, “I’m Not Your Brother!”: Video Reveals Police’s Stunning 
Double-Standard for Black Americans, SALON (Aug. 29, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.salon
.com/2014/08/29/st_paul_cops_tase_and_arrest_black_man_for_waiting_to_pick_his_kids_up
_from_preschool/ [https://perma.cc/PS42-UW3X]. 
 221. The reference is to the arrest of Henry Louis Gates after an officer suspected him of 
burglary. See Abby Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer Is Accused of Bias, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21gates.html [https://perma.cc
/NR4X-NMNL]. As I have detailed elsewhere, a number of “law-abiding minority 
professors”—Cornel West, William Julius Wilson, Paul Butler, and Devon Carbado—have 
been subjected to police stops. Capers, supra note 9, at 18. 
 222. See Geoffrey Gardner, White Cop Disciplined for Profiling Black Police Chief, NPR 
(May 13, 2008, 5:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/newsandviews/2008/05/nypd_disciplines
_white_officer.html [https://perma.cc/7QEU-3T74]. 
 223. See Louis Nelson, Sen. Tim Scott Reveals Incidents of Being Targeted by Capitol 
Police, POLITICO (July 13, 2016, 7:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/tim-scott-
capitol-racism-senate-225507 [https://perma.cc/75EV-84PV]. 
 224. See Gene Demby, Two Tales of Profiling, from the Highest Offices in the Land, NPR: 
CODE SWITCH (July 19, 2013, 7:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/07/19
/203715163/two-tales-of-profiling-from-the-highest-offices-in-the-land [https://perma.cc/M6MK-
3R8Y] (describing Attorney General Eric Holder’s experience being profiled by the police). 
 225. See NEIL DEGRASSE TYSON, THE SKY IS NOT THE LIMIT: ADVENTURES OF AN 
URBAN ASTROPHYSICIST 134 (2004).  
 226. As I have documented elsewhere, whites are often targeted for stops in 
predominantly minority neighborhoods on the assumption that they are drug purchasers. See 
Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 17, at 66 n.148. 
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can play in combatting police violence could even be obvious. Scanners, 
for example, could immediately tell officers that a suspect is unarmed, 
often enough to obviate the need for deadly force. Big Data could also 
tell officers whether a suspect has a history of violence or resisting 
arrest.227 Beyond that, public surveillance cameras can capture and make 
visible police use of excessive force. Indeed, they could even have 
advantages over recordings from body-worn cameras or police vehicle 
dashboard cameras. Body-worn cameras and dashboard cameras show 
police citizen interactions from the police officer’s perspective.228 While 
this perspective is important, especially in cases where officers claim 
they acted with honest and reasonable belief, it is not the only 
perspective, let alone the most objective one.229 On top of that, there is 
legitimate concern that the police, both ex ante and ex post, have the 
ability to control and edit the resulting film.230 Indeed, there is evidence 
that the officer who shot Laquan McDonald in Chicago tampered with 
his dashboard camera231 and evidence that an officer involved in the 
shooting of Keith Lamont Scott in Charlotte failed to activate his 
camera, in violation of departmental police rules.232 All of this might 
undermine the goal of objectivity or capturing the full picture.233 Public 
 
 227. Cf. Jouvenal, supra note 193 (discussing the use of technology to evaluate the threat a 
person poses). 
 228. For a discussion of the impact of perspective on objective truth, see Mary D. Fan, 
Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 16–18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract
_id=2773886 [https://perma.cc/BY3D-Y4JE (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 229. On the role perspective and angle play in determining the “truth” of video evidence, 
see Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1335–36 
(2010). 
 230. As one observer put it, the current system, in which the police themselves control 
footage of police citizen interactions, is like “the fox guarding the henhouse.” Sarah 
Lustbader, The Real Problem with Police Video, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/opinion/the-real-problem-with-police-video.html? _r=0 [https://
perma.cc/55YX-V7QU]; see also Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 
403 (2016) (“[D]espite its name, community policing efforts remain in control of the 
police	.	.	.	.”). 
 231. Sebastian Murdock, The Cop Who Killed Laquan McDonald Had Broken His 
Dashcam on Purpose, Report Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2016, 8:42 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chicago-police-damaged-dashcam-microphones_us
_56a952f6e4b0d82286d4e101?utm_hp_ref=black-voices&&utm_hp_ref=black-voices 
[https://perma.cc/8CG8-ERXB]. 
 232. Welsey Lowery, Charlotte Officer Did Not Activate Body Camera Until After Keith 
Scott Had Been Shot, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/post-nation/wp/2016/09/26/charlotte-officer-did-not-activate-body-camera-until-after-keith-
scott-had-been-shot-2/?utm_term=.b9c4a0d2021a [https://perma.cc/2ZVK-5UW9]. 
 233. For these reasons, copwatching groups often have strict requirements about how 
members should film the police. See Simonson, supra note 230, at 396. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017) 
1280 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
surveillance cameras, if done properly with public input and control, 
bypass these problems. 
The role technology can play in addressing underenforcement is 
less direct but important too. Quite simply, to the extent technology can 
increase accuracy and efficiency in policing, it can free officers to engage 
in the work that those of us who are black and brown and white want 
them to do: actual policing. Just consider one statistic: police in this 
country fail to make an arrest in about one-third of all murders in this 
country.234 Allow me to say this again: a full one-third of all murders go 
unsolved. And this does not even begin to get at other unsolved crimes, 
including violent crimes and financial and property crimes.235 Now 
imagine if officers, instead of focusing their resources on black and 
brown people who are Terry innocent, redirected their resources to 
solve real crimes. 
There is much more to be said about using technology to rethink 
policing. But for now, here are just a few observations. Technology, in 
the form of public surveillance cameras, could very well deter officers 
from committing Fourth Amendment violations,236 much in the way they 
deter other law breaking. Of equal importance, because public 
surveillance cameras are specular, they have the potential to educate 
judges about how the Fourth Amendment is really being applied and 
thus counter myopic perspectives that already tip the scales in favor of 
the police. This last point cannot be overstated since such an education 
has the potential to “help change constitutional meaning.”237 
Technology, to borrow from Professors Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, 
can serve “demosprudence[.]”238 
I end this Part by returning to the case that, in effect, gave its 
blessing to racialized policing, Terry v. Ohio. As another policing and 
 
 234. See Getting Away with Murder, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2015), http://www.economist
.com/news/united-states/21656725-police-fail-make-arrest-more-third-nations-killings-getting-
away [https://perma.cc/RYT2-4N93]; Martin Kaste, Open Cases: Why One-Third of Murders 
in America Go Unresolved, NPR (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03
/30/395069137/open-cases-why-one-third-of-murders-in-america-go-unresolved [https://perma.cc
/Z7V2-CG28]. 
 235. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2013, at 2 (2013), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2013/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/clearances/clearancetopic_final [https://perma.cc
/WB95-QJK3] (noting, among other things, that in 2013 only 48.1% of violent crime and 
19.7% of property crimes were cleared by arrest or similar disposition). 
 236. See Simonson, supra note 230, at 425. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a 
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749–50 (2014) (coining 
the term “demosprudence” to describe action, instigated by “ordinary people[,]” to change 
“the people who make the law and the landscape in which that law is made”). 
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technology scholar recently observed, were the facts of Terry to occur 
today, an officer would be able to use facial recognition technology and 
a data search to learn that Terry—who was observed with his companion 
repeatedly peering into a store window—has a prior criminal record and 
several prior arrests.239 The detective would learn through pattern 
matching links that Terry associates with a known local gangster, Billy 
Cox.240 And the detective would learn that Terry, unlike the typical 
window shopper, has a substance abuse problem.241 Add to this a long-
range scanner, and Detective McFadden would also know that both 
Terry and his companion were armed. In short, this information, 
combined with the detective’s observation of behavior consistent with 
casing a store, would make the detective’s finding of articulable, 
reasonable suspicion far stronger and far more reliable. This is the 
beauty of using technology to aid policing. 
But there is another beauty that is equally important. It can reduce 
racialized policing. Two men taking turns looking into a store window 
might indicate that criminal activity “may be afoot[,]”242 but then again it 
might not. The two men might instead be my shopping buddy and I, 
admiring a Marc Jacobs overcoat or a Paul Smith suit in the window of 
Barney’s. My shopping buddy and I are black men after all, Terry and 
his companion redux. Given the ubiquity of surveillance cameras in the 
world I envision, the officers should realize that it is unlikely either of us 
would publicly engage in criminal activity, especially something so 
public as robbing a store. They would certainly already know that 
neither one of us is armed, assuming the officers had already scanned 
the entire street with their terahertz scanners. In any event, facial 
recognition software and access to data would be able to assure police of 
our Terry innocence in seconds. They would learn that I am a law 
professor who writes extensively about policing and that I am a former 
federal prosecutor.243 There would be no need for me to be “grabbed” or 
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“spun	.	.	.	around” or “patted down[.]”244 The two of us, like other law-
abiding citizens, would be allowed to shop—or at least window shop. 
Lest this sound like I subscribe to a “politics of distinction[,]”245 this 
technology would also benefit black and brown folk who cannot claim 
the advantages I have. It can benefit the kid from the projects who is 
young and black and whose “hat’s real low”246 and who, because of 
racialized policing and overcriminalization, has even been busted for 
marijuana use a couple of times and jumping a turnstile once, but who 
dreams of one day making enough to buy the same Marc Jacobs coat I 
am eyeing. Instead of relying on heuristics and implicit biases and race 
as a proxy for criminality to conclude that 
“[y]oung	+	[b]lack	+	[m]ale	=	[p]robable [c]ause[,]”247 officers would 
already know from their earlier scan of the street that the kid is 
unarmed. Facial recognition technology and access to data should 
similarly tell them that there is insufficient basis for a forcible stop. 
Recreational drug use and turnstile jumping are not probative of casing 
a place. Even if they chose to approach the kid and attempt a consensual 
encounter or “near-seizure,”248 public surveillance cameras would 
capture this, making a record that can later be used to educate judges, 
and police officers themselves, about discriminatory policing and thus 
potentially “help change constitutional meaning.”249 Even for black and 
brown folk who do not share my advantages, this has to be better than 
the status quo. 
But the larger point is this: With the technology I am advancing, 
none of us would need to be singled out because of race. Or more 
accurately, everyone else would be subjected to the same soft 
surveillance. The Asian woman with the briefcase. The white 
businessman trying to hail a cab. The messenger on his bike. The elderly 
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woman walking her poodle. Everyone. Certainly, this gets us closer to 
equality before the law. 
III.  THE REDISTRIBUTION OF PRIVACY 
Still, I can imagine the hesitation, especially from civil libertarians 
and progressives. What I am proposing, after all, is more policing, not 
less. In exchange for deracialized policing, there will have to be more 
policing of everyone, albeit in the form of soft surveillance. I am 
essentially proposing that some people cede some of the privacy that 
they currently enjoy for the greater good of everyone. My task, then, is 
to show that the sacrifice will be worth it. In doing so, I will have to 
expose a raw truth: that privacy has always been unequal, and it is past 
time that it was redistributed. But first, I turn to a far more conventional 
argument to support my proposals: that equalizing privacy can support 
perceptions of legitimacy and counter legal cynicism. 
A. Legitimacy and Legal Cynicism 
As Tom Tyler demonstrated decades ago in his highly influential 
Why People Obey the Law,250 punishment plays a relatively minor role in 
inducing compliance with the law.251 Far more important are the roles 
societal and community norms play in policing behavior.252 More 
important too are perceptions of legitimacy.253 The more individuals 
believe that the law is both fair and fairly applied, the more likely it is 
that those individuals will comply with the law.254 Tyler’s Chicago study 
is a case in point. At its most basic, his longitudinal study of randomly 
selected Chicago residents found that heightened perceptions of 
legitimacy increase compliance with the law.255 Tyler has also examined 
the role legitimacy plays among blacks and Hispanics with a particular 
focus on “high-risk” individuals, namely black and Hispanic males 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.256 His findings were 
consistent: perceptions of legitimacy play a significant role in voluntary 
compliance with the law.257 Janice Nadler’s research adds another data 
point to legitimacy theory.258 Her research suggests that, just as 
 
 250. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–4 (1990). 
 251. See id.  
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perceptions of legitimacy contribute to voluntary compliance with the 
law, perceptions of illegitimacy contribute to its very opposite, 
noncompliance.259 Indeed, her research is consistent with Judge 
Brandeis’s intuition in his oft-cited dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States,260 a case involving the government’s use of wiretaps, without first 
obtaining a warrant, to listen in on conversations.261 Judge Brandeis 
wrote, “If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy.”262 
The perception of illegitimacy has particular consequences for the 
problems of police violence, underenforcement, and racial profiling. 
Law enforcement’s very prevalence in black and brown communities 
contributes to the perception that the police are “above the law[,]”263 
“just another gang[,]”264 an occupying force.265 Instead of inducing 
compliance with the law, racialized policing contributes to minorities 
feeling less obliged to obey the law or defer to legal authorities.266 
Equally troubling, it might induce law breaking.267 It is thus unsurprising 
that the Final Report of the White House Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing from May 2015 emphasizes increasing legitimacy as crucial to 
police reform.268 Even more recently, Monica Bell has built upon the 
insights of legitimacy theory to add “legal cynicism”—the feeling shared 
by many of us who are black and brown that we are “essentially 
stateless, unprotected by the law and its enforcers, marginal to the 
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project of making American society.”269 Bell’s legal cynicism theory thus 
identifies another barrier to equal policing and, in turn, equal 
citizenship. 
The point here is straightforward. To the extent technology can 
deracialize policing, it can increase perceptions of legitimacy, which in 
turn can increase voluntary compliance with the law. So here is the first 
argument for using technology to deracialize policing: it can reduce 
crime. Of equal importance, it can counter the feeling of legal cynicism 
that pervades many minority communities and thus further the goal of 
belonging and equal citizenship. And that, in turn, benefits everyone. 
B. The Redistribution of Privacy 
My primary argument to support more technology to deracialize 
policing turns on the redistribution of privacy. But an emendation could 
be useful. Instead of thinking of it as the redistribution of privacy, it 
might help to think of it as the equalizing of privacy. Because this is the 
hard truth: privacy has never been distributed equally.270 Those who are 
privileged have always enjoyed a surfeit. And if we care about equality, 
then we should also care about equalizing privacy. I will return to this 
point in a minute. First, I should elaborate on what I mean when I say 
that privacy has never been equal. I begin with a news item that will be 
familiar to many but strikes a particular chord with those of us who are 
black or brown. 
On January 23, 2012, Senator Rand Paul was attempting to board a 
flight from Nashville to Washington, D.C., when he refused a 
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) security pat down and, 
as one newspaper put it, set off “a mini-firestorm[.]”271 It mattered little 
that the actual incident was quickly resolved.272 His father, then 
Representative Ron Paul, at the time engaged in his own presidential 
bid, took to his campaign’s official Twitter account and stated: “My son 
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@SenRandPaul being detained by TSA for refusing full body pat down 
after anomaly in body scanner in Nashville.”273 The elder Paul also 
vowed to dismantle the TSA if he were elected president, stating, 
The police state in this country is growing out of control. One of 
the ultimate embodiments of this is the TSA that gropes and grabs 
our children, our seniors, and our loved ones and neighbors with 
disabilities. The TSA does all of this while doing nothing to keep 
us safe.274 
This was not the first time someone had complained about TSA 
screenings and privacy. Prior to Senator Paul’s incident, Texas Governor 
Rick Perry had pushed a state bill that would criminalize “intrusive” 
airport pat downs.275 The Alaska State Legislature, after a “humiliating” 
pat down of one of its members, had passed a resolution, declaring that 
“no one should have to sacrifice their dignity in order to travel.”276 There 
had even been a “Don’t Touch My Junk” movement after a passenger 
posted a YouTube video of himself refusing a TSA pat down with the 
words, “If you touch my junk, I’m gonna have you arrested.”277 
The point here is not to trivialize calls for less intrusive airport 
searches, a topic I have addressed in other work.278 Rather, the point is 
to situate these calls against the reduced privacy routinely experienced a 
million times over279 by those of us who are black or brown and who are 
driving,280 or simply exercising the “right of locomotion.”281 Viewed 
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against this larger backdrop, the assault on privacy felt by Senator Rand 
Paul and others reveals itself to be one of the many ways that privacy is 
distributed unequally. To Senator Paul and others, to be delayed and 
patted down at an airport was unprecedented and humiliating. For those 
of us of a darker hue (including those who appear to be Arab or 
Muslim), such looks, stops, and frisks are part of the way we live now 
and have lived for a long time.282 
A similar observation can be made about the outcry that greeted 
Edward Snowden’s revelations about the U.S. government’s domestic 
spying program283 or even more recent discussions about the 
government’s efforts to force Apple to de-encrypt its iPhones.284 The 
Snowden revelation sparked a national conversation about domestic 
surveillance, privacy, and even tools for evading surveillance.285 But as 
Mary Anne Franks observes, “The privacy movement	.	.	.	has tended to 
center on the concerns of the privileged.”286 Jane Bailey, a critical 
feminist, is even more blunt: 
It seems to me that [the response to NSA spying] has arisen 
because privileged white men feel exposed now. And for some 
reason it annoys me that they are acting like they’ve “discovered” 
surveillance for the first time and when they do it’s almost always 
with a myopic civil libertarian focus on state power. The fact of 
the matter is members of subordinated groups have known the 
power and technologies of surveillance for some time. For these 
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groups, surveillance is and always has been inescapably noticeable 
because it is part of everyday life.287 
That we have a history of unequal privacy might surprise those who 
have always taken privacy for granted. But for the rest of us, again, this 
lack of privacy is nothing new. Indeed, to some extent, unequal privacy 
is all that we have ever known. This is especially true of what I term 
“unequal private privacy.” Black slaves were certainly denied the luxury 
of privacy. They certainly could not assert the right to be “secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects[.]”288 As persons, or more accurately 
“chattels personal[,]”289 security was entirely foreign. They were simply 
commodities, bought and sold, auctioned based on their bodies to better 
determine their value,290 raped, and, like chattel, bred.291 As for papers, 
“one of the unifying tenets of slave codes was that blacks should not 
read[,]”292 a tenet that was codified in several states, including North 
Carolina.293 To have paper with writing on it was enough to subject 
slaves to corporal punishment, including whipping, branding, and, in 
some cases, amputation.294 And as far as the papers that were 
occasionally allowed—passes or free papers—these were subject to 
inspection and rejection at any time by slave patrols.295 As for houses 
and effects, as property themselves, slaves had none to claim as their 
own. Above all, these slaves were subjected to constant monitoring, as 
the common practice of using overseers and slave patrols—one of the 
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precursors to the modern day police296—attests to. Such unequal privacy 
was not limited to the South. In New York City, for example, there were 
lantern laws, or ordinances “For Regulating Negroes and Slaves in the 
Night Time.”297 Under these lantern laws, blacks on streets “an hour 
after Sun-set” had to be accompanied by “some White Person[.]”298 
Otherwise, they must carry a “[lantern] and lighted Candle in it, so as 
the light thereof may be plainly seen[.]”299 As Simone Browne observes, 
these lantern laws “made it possible for the black body to be constantly 
illuminated from dusk to dawn, made knowable, locatable, and 
contained within the city.”300 
Even today, unequal private privacy is the norm. Those of us who 
are black or brown continue to be subjected to private surveillance by 
other citizens when shopping,301 when driving,302 when flying,303 when 
walking,304 and even when entering our own homes.305 
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But it is the problem of what I term “unequal public privacy,” or 
privacy vis-à-vis the government, that is my focus. It is one thing when 
citizens treat each other unequally. It is another thing entirely when the 
state engages in such unequal treatment,306 though the two are linked 
and reinforce one another.307 Quite simply, black and brown folk are 
more likely to be watched by the police, stopped by the police, and 
frisked by the police. In the everyday world of policing, we are treated as 
the “panoptic sort,”308 and as “always already suspect.”309 Scholars refer 
to this phenomenon as “hypervisibility[.]”310 But this term is only partly 
accurate and obscures an important predicate. To be sure, those of us 
who are black or brown are often hyper-visible vis-à-vis the police. But 
this is largely because the police subject us to hyper-surveillance, or to 
repurpose a legal term, “heightened scrutiny.” 
Allow me to end with an example that serves as a bookend to the 
example I started with involving Senator Rand Paul. Consider the story 
of Tunde Clement, a black man who was traveling from New York City 
to Albany, New York, and was carrying a backpack, which alone 
apparently was enough to subject him to a racially inflected look, stop, 
and encounter.311 According to news reports, the officers “cornered 
Clement and began peppering him with questions.”312 The officers then 
handcuffed him, at which point 
[h]e was taken to a station to be strip-searched and then to a 
hospital, where doctors forcibly sedated him with a cocktail of 
powerful drugs	.	.	.	. A camera was inserted in his rectum, he was 
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forced to vomit and his blood and urine were tested for drugs and 
alcohol. Scans of his digestive system were performed using X-ray 
machines, according to hospital records obtained by the Times 
Union. The search, conducted without a warrant, came up 
empty.313 
After ten hours in custody, Clement was given an appearance ticket 
for resisting arrest and released; the charge was later dismissed.314 
According to the local defense bar, Clement’s experience was far from 
unique. As one defense lawyer put it, pursuant to Albany police 
interdiction policy, “every black man who came through the bus station 
was being literally grabbed and dragged into the men’s room and 
searched	.	.	.	.	Occasionally, of course, they would get lucky and find 
some drugs. But the vast, overwhelming majority of black men searched 
were clean.”315 
So this is the hard truth. For many Americans, being subjected to 
“heightened scrutiny” when they go through airport surveillance might 
be new, humiliating, and unsettling. But for those of us of the darker 
hue, there is a different story entirely. My final argument then is this: 
although the technology I have been advancing could mean that 
Americans who currently enjoy privacy might have to cede some in 
terms of more widespread soft surveillance, this more widespread 
surveillance will have the benefit of distributing privacy more equally. 
For this too is the hard truth: the goal of true equality will be an exercise 
in futility if we are only talking about the poor, about the downtrodden, 
and about those of us who are black and brown. We must also talk about 
those who are privileged and what privileges must be shared by all. In 
short, to the same extent that technology can deracialize and de-bias 
policing, it can also redistribute privacy among citizens in a way that is 
more egalitarian and consistent with our democratic ideals. Indeed, it 
could even have the potential to better distribute privacy between 
citizens and the police, since there too lies a troubling imbalance. 
To be sure, the techno-policing I am advocating will not be a 
complete cure-all in terms of leveling privacy imbalances and making 
policing more fair, especially given how interconnected and how 
networked316 every aspect of our criminal justice system is. But of this 
much I am sure: it is a significant step in the right direction. 
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CONCLUSION 
I am a black man. For me, the personal is the political. It is 
inseparable from how I think about the Fourth Amendment, how I think 
about policing, and how I think about the way we live now. That is why I 
have tried to make an argument for more technology in policing, even if 
it means, or perhaps I should say especially if it means, the redistribution 
of privacy. The costs, especially to those who already enjoy an 
abundance of privacy, might seem great. But even greater should be 
possibility of what we can become. A fairer society. A more just society. 
A society where, just possibly, all of us, including those of us who are 
black and brown, can be equal before the law. In short, a society that 
gets us closer to the dream the Founders could not have imagined but 
was there all along in the text, waiting to be born. Or to be truly read. 
But already, I am getting ahead of myself. So for now, in this liminal 
moment, allow me to return to policing. If the goal is equality in 
policing, if the goal is efficiency and transparency and crime reduction, 
this Essay maps a route there. 
